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 Abstract 
 
This paper examines the position of third party liability for ‘knowing receipt’ and 
‘knowing assistance’ under Barnes v Addy in Australia following the decision of the Full 
Court of the Federal Court of Australia in Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No 2). 
Grimaldi demonstrates that third party liability under Barnes v Addy is a primary, fault 
based liability concerned with the wrongdoing of the third party. There remains a 
technical distinction between the ‘two limbs’ of Barnes v Addy on the basis that a 
dishonest state of mind on the part of the breaching fiduciary or trustee is required to 
trigger liability for knowing assistance, but not for knowing receipt. Liability for both 
knowing receipt and knowing assistance is based on the third party’s level of knowledge 
relevant to the breach of trust or fiduciary duty. Knowledge falling within categories (i)-
(iv) of the Baden scale, but not category (v) will trigger liability under both limbs.  
Corporate property misapplied in breach of fiduciary duty is treated as trust property for 
the purposes of third party liability under Barnes v Addy in Australia, despite recent 
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A person who has been knowingly concerned in a breach of trust, or who receives trust 
property transferred in a breach of trust, may be personally liable to the beneficiaries of 
the trust.1 This is commonly referred to as the principle derived from Barnes v Addy,2 
although it is important to note that there are bases other than those expressed in Barnes 
v Addy under which a third party may become liable because of their involvement in a 
breach of trust.3  
 
In The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 9),4 Owen J noted 
that the jurisprudence surrounding the Barnes v Addy principle is disparate and 
complex,5 and declined to attempt the ‘architectonic task’ of resolving all of the related 
difficulties and debates.6  
 
While the unanimous decision of the High Court in Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-
Dee Pty Ltd7 resolved some of the difficulty surrounding the modern-day application of 
Barnes v Addy, some contentious issues remain.8 Not long after the decision in Farah, 
Owen J considered a number of these issues in Bell Group. Justice Owen’s decision 
provides a substantial and valuable analysis of the state of the law surrounding Barnes v 
Addy up to, and including the decision in Farah.9 More recently, the Full Court of the 
Federal Court of Australia considered the Barnes v Addy principles in Grimaldi v 
Chameleon Mining NL (ACN 098 773 785) (No 2) and Another,10 hence providing the 
highest authority on the issue since Farah.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corp (No 9) (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4627]. 
2 (1874) 9 Ch App 244. 
3 Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corp (No 9) (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4627]. 
4 (2008) 39 WAR 1 (‘Bell Group’). 
5 Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4629]. 
6 Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4629]. 
7 (2007) 230 CLR 89 (‘Farah’). 
8 Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4630]. 
9 See Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4627]-[4804]. 
10 (2012) 287 ALR 22 (‘Grimaldi’). 
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This paper examines the Full Court position in Grimaldi in the context of the wider 
debate surrounding third party Barnes v Addy liability and draws some conclusions as to 
the current position of such liability in Australia following the Grimaldi decision. It 
commences with an overview of the principles and uncertainties associated with Barnes 
v Addy liability, before considering the justifications for imposing a personal liability on 
third party participants in breaches of fiduciary duty, which act as a driver for the 
remedies that may be appropriate. Finally, it considers the Full Court’s approach to third 
party liability and the application of the Barnes v Addy principles in Grimaldi. 
 
While the decision in Grimaldi is important in relation to other aspects of corporations 
law, in particular the situations in which a person may be considered a de facto director 
of a corporation under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)11 and the liability of fiduciaries 
who receive bribes and secret commissions in breach of duty,12 this discussion is 
concerned solely with the aspects of the Grimaldi decision relevant to the liability of 
third party participants in breaches of fiduciary duty. 
  
II THIRD PARTY LIABILITY UNDER BARNES v ADDY 
 
A Barnes v Addy 
 
Barnes v Addy was concerned with trustees of a trust fund who entered into a transaction 
in breach of trust and subsequently lost trust money. The beneficiaries of the trust sought 
to recover their losses from both the surviving trustee and the solicitors who had advised 
in relation to the transaction. The issue in the case was whether strangers to the trust 
could be held personally responsible for a breach of trust by the trustees. The claim 
against the solicitors failed as they were found to have no knowledge of, nor any reason 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 See Grimaldi (2012) 287 ALR 22 at [28]-[143]. 
12 See Grimaldi (2012) 287 ALR 22 at [188]-[193], [569]-[584]. 
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to suspect, that the relevant transaction involved a dishonest design on the part of the 
trustees.13  
 
In a famous passage from Barnes v Addy, Lord Selborne stated that: 
 
Those who create a trust clothe the trustee with a legal power and control over the trust property, 
imposing on him a corresponding responsibility. That responsibility may no doubt be extended in 
equity to others who are not properly trustees, if they are found either making themselves trustees de 
son tort, or actually participating in any fraudulent conduct of the trustee to the injury of the cestui 
que trust. But, on the other hand, strangers are not to be made constructive trustees merely because 
they act as the agents of trustees in transactions within their legal powers, transactions perhaps of 
which a Court of Equity may disapprove, unless those agents receive and become chargeable with 
some part of the trust property, or unless they assist with knowledge in a dishonest and fraudulent 
design on the part of the trustees.14 
 
While not immune to criticism,15 Lord Selborne’s formula is accepted in Australian 
law.16 
 
It is common to refer to Lord Selborne’s statement as containing ‘two limbs’,17 from 
here on described as ‘knowing receipt’ and ‘knowing assistance’. A knowing recipient is 
someone who receives and becomes chargeable with some part of the trust property as a 
result of his or her knowledge of the relevant breach of trust.18 A knowing assistant is 
someone who acts as an accessory to the relevant breach of trust.19 Various alternative 
phrases such as ‘knowing participation’, ‘accessory liability’, ‘dishonest receipt’ and 
‘dishonest assistance’ have also been used in relation to either or both limbs in cases and 
commentary,20 further adding to the confusion in the Barnes v Addy debate.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 See Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4632]. 
14 Barnes v Addy (1874) 9 Ch App 244 at 251-252. 
15 Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4636]. 
16 Farah (2007) 230 CLR 89; Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4640]. 
17 Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4634]. 
18 Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4634]. 
19 Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4634].  
20 Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [3634]; Joachim Dietrich and Pauline Ridge, ‘The Receipt of What?: 
Questions Concerning Third Party Recipient Liability in Equity and Unjust Enrichment’ (2007) 31 
Melbourne University Law Review 47; Pauline Ridge, ‘Justifying the Remedies for Dishonest Assistance’ 
(2008) 124 Law Quarterly Review 445.  
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B The Distinction Between the Two Limbs 
 
Debate abounds as to whether the two limbs of Barnes v Addy are distinct and separate 
liabilities, or merely ‘two different species of a single genus of liabilities’.21  
 
In Consul Development Pty Ltd v DPC Estates Pty Ltd,22 Stephen J determined that a 
distinction between the two limbs existed, with constructive knowledge sufficing for 
liability under the knowing receipt limb, but actual knowledge required for knowing 
assistance liability.23 Despite this, Stephen J was unclear on why such a distinction 
existed, speculating that the basis of the distinction was perhaps a property protection 
rationale: 
 
[P]erhaps its origin lies in equitable doctrines of tracing, perhaps in equity’s concern for the 
protection of equitable estates and interests in property which comes into the hands of purchasers 
for value.24 
 
Denis Ong notes that Gibbs J took a contrary position in Consul Development in 
considering that third parties may be liable for knowing assistance where the assistance 
rendered is solely the knowing receipt of trust property.25 Gibbs J referred to persons 
who ‘assist with knowledge in a dishonest and fraudulent design on the part of the 
trustees’ as including persons who ‘received trust property’ and ‘dealt with it in a 
manner inconsistent with trusts of which [they were] cognizant’.26 His Honour also 
considered that liability for knowing assistance could arise ‘even though’ (rather than 
‘only if’) the third party had not received trust property.27  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Grimaldi (2012) 287 ALR 22 at [257]. 
22 (1975) 132 CLR 373 (‘Consul Development’). 
23 Consul Development (1975) 132 CLR 373 at 410 (Stephen J). 
24 Consul Development (1975) 132 CLR 373 at 410 (Stephen J); Denis Ong, ‘The Knowledge or Role that 
Makes a Person an Accessory Under the Barnes v Addy Principle’ (2005) 17(2) Bond Law Review 102, 
119. 
25 Ong, above n 24,117. 
26 Ibid, 117; Consul Development (1975) 287 ALR 22 at 396-397 (Gibbs J). 
27 Consul Development (1975) 132 CLR 373 at 397 (Gibbs J). 
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Of the two other justices determining Consul Development, Barwick CJ concurred with 
the view of Stephen J,28 and McTiernan J, while not expressly disavowing the existence 
of two limbs, referred broadly to liability attaching to third parties who ‘participate in’29 
or ‘encourage’30 breaches of fiduciary duty. Ong argues that the judgment of McTiernan 
J demonstrates that his Honour considered there to be no distinction between the two 
limbs of Barnes v Addy.31 While it is difficult to argue that McTiernan J’s judgment 
demonstrates this view conclusively, it is submitted that Ong’s interpretation is correct. 
Consul Development was a case concerned with knowing receipt; his Honour’s use of 
language (with participation and encouragement arguably more suggestive of assistance 
than receipt), coupled with a failure to acknowledge any distinction between knowing 
receipt and knowing assistance in his discussion, suggest that his Honour considered 
knowing receipt to be a type of knowing assistance, as versus a distinct and separate 
liability.  
 
Ong notes that the distinction between the two limbs of Barnes v Addy is not one of 
‘ancient lineage’.32 A distinction was first drawn between the limbs in 1971 by 
Brightman J in the English decision of Karak Rubber Co Ltd v Burden,33 some ninety-
seven years after Lord Selborne’s judgment in Barnes v Addy.34 While Brightman J 
noted the distinction between the limbs, he considered that the level of knowledge 
required for knowing receipt and knowing assistance was the same for both limbs.35 Ong 
notes that it was not until 1973, in the first instance decision of Jacobs P in Consul 
Development, that a distinction was drawn between the knowledge requirements of the 
two limbs:36  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Consul Development (1975) 132 CLR 373. 
29 Consul Development (1975) 132 CLR 373 at 378 (McTiernan J). 
30 Consul Development (1975) 132 CLR 373 at 386 (McTiernan J). 
31 Ong, above n 24, 118. 
32 Ibid, 119. 
33 [1972] 1 WLR 602 (‘Karak’). 
34 Ong, above n 24, 119. 
35 Ibid, 119. 
36 Ibid, 119. 
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[t]he point of the difference between the person receiving trust property and the person who is 
made liable, even though he is not actually a recipient of trust property, is that in the first place, 
knowledge, actual or constructive of the trust is sufficient, but in the second place something 
more is required, and that something more appears to me to be the actual knowledge of the 
fraudulent or dishonest design, so that the person concerned can truly be described as a 
participant in that fraudulent dishonest activity.37 
 
Stephen J, with whom Barwick CJ agreed, upheld Jacob P’s conclusion on appeal.38 
 
Ong attacks Jacob P’s formulation on several grounds. Firstly, he notes that Jacobs P’s 
conclusion that the defendant must have actual knowledge of the dishonest and 
fraudulent design is inconsistent with Lord Selborne’s position in Barnes v Addy, which 
considered that the defendant’s knowledge or suspicion would be sufficient to give rise 
to participant liability.39 Ong also considers that Lord Selborne made it clear that the 
sole criterion for all classes of agents to whom the liability may attach was fraud and 
dishonesty, when he stated that: 
 
[T]hose who create trusts do expressly intend, in the absence of fraud and dishonesty, to 
exonerate such agents of all classes from the responsibilities which are expressly incumbent… 
upon the trustees.40 
 
Secondly, Ong attacks Jacob P’s reliance on the English Court of Appeal decision in 
Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Herbert Smith (No 2)41 as authority for the conclusion that a greater 
level of knowledge is required for knowing assistance.42 Ong notes that Carl Zeiss 
Stiftung did not distinguish between knowing assistance and knowing receipt, and was 
decided three years prior to such a distinction first being made in Karak.43 While Jabobs 
P relied on Edmund Davies LJ’s comments in Carl Zeiss Stiftung as support for the 
conclusion that a want of probity is necessary for liability as a constructive trustee to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 DPC Estates Pty Ltd v Grey & Consul Development Pty Ltd [1974] 1 NSWLR 443 at 459 (Jacobs P). 
38 Consul Development (1975) 132 CLR 373 at 410 (Stephen J). 
39 Ong, above n 24, 120. 
40 Barnes v Addy (1874) 9 Ch App 244 at 252 (emphasis added); Ong, above n 24, 121. 
41 [1969] 2 Ch 276 (‘Carl Zeiss Stiftung’). 
42 Ong, above n 24, 120. 
43 Ibid, 120. 
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arise where there has been no receipt of trust property,44 Edmunds LJ in fact considered 
a want of probity necessary to give rise to liability as a constructive trustee however 
created (that is, regardless of whether or not trust property had been received in relation 
to the breach).45 Ong considers that this is consistent with Lord Selborne’s position in 
Barnes v Addy that dishonesty is the sole criterion required to give rise to all classes of 
liability.46  
 
Ong questions whether it is even conceptually possible to knowingly receive trust 
property in breach of trust without also assisting in that breach of trust.47 Where 
someone receives property knowingly in breach of trust, Ong considers that they have 
unavoidably assisted with the breach of trust, as the breach itself is reliant on the transfer 
of property.48 In such circumstances, the recipient of the trust property is liable not for 
knowing receipt, but instead for knowing assistance, with the receipt of the trust 
property merely the means by which they assisted the breach.49 Ong considers that a 
similar situation occurs even where the assistant does not receive the property 
themselves, but instead persuades the trustee to transfer property to a third party in 
breach of trust. If this third party has sufficient knowledge of the breach to be charged 
with knowing receipt, they must also unavoidably have assisted with the breach of 
trust.50 Why, Ong postulates, should the level of knowledge required to charge the non-
recipient assistant with assistance liability be higher than that required to charge the 
recipient assistant with recipient liability, where the breach is essentially the same 
breach?51  
 
Likewise, Dietrich and Ridge consider that the proper view is one of no true distinction 
between knowing assistance and knowing receipt. In their view, recipient liability is 
subsumed within an equitable regime of participatory liability (by receipt of trust 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Ibid, 120. 
45 Ibid, 120; Carl Zeiss Stiftung [1969] 2 Ch 276 at 302 (Edmund Davies LJ) (emphasis added). 
46 Ong, above n 24, 121. 
47 Ibid, 121. 
48 Ibid, 121. 
49 Ibid, 121. 
50 Ibid, 122. 
51 Ibid, 122. 
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property or otherwise) in a breach of trust or fiduciary duty.52 Recipient liability 
therefore should be viewed as a subset of, rather than distinct from, knowing assistance 
liability.53 The basis for this is the justification for the recipient liability, which Dietrich 
and Ridge consider to be a fault based liability concerned with the wrongdoing of the 
recipient.54 As liability for knowing assistance is also fault based, there is no real need to 
distinguish between the two limbs of Barnes v Addy; both are essentially liability rules 
focused on participation in wrongs.55 
 
Following the High Court’s decision in Farah,56 Owen J determined in Bell Group that 
there must be a certain level of dishonesty on the part of the breaching fiduciary in order 
to give rise to Barnes v Addy liability on the part of a third party assistant to the breach. 
His Honour’s considered that the conduct of the fiduciary must be attended by 
circumstances that would attract a ‘degree of opprobrium’ raising it above the level of a 
simple breach of trust or duty.57 Conversely, there appears to be no need for dishonesty 
on the part of a knowing recipient.58 His Honour considered there to be a distinction 
between the two limbs of Barnes v Addy on the basis of this dishonesty distinction: 
 
One significant difference between the two limbs is that a stranger can only be liable for knowing 
receipt if property has come into his or her hands; while a knowing assistance case does not 
necessarily involve a transfer of property to the stranger, who might, accordingly, be called to 
account even though she or he has not enjoyed a personal benefit. This distinction may explain 
why knowing assistance requires malappropriation on the part of the fiduciary whereas 
misapplication might suffice in the case of knowing receipt.59 
 
Owen J’s conclusions contrast with Ong’s view of Lord Selborne’s single genus of 
liability and highlight the current difficulty inherent in a one-limb analysis of Barnes v 
Addy liability. If, as Ong suggests, knowing receipt necessarily involves knowing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Dietrich and Ridge, above n 20, 60. 
53 Ibid, 60. 
54 Ibid, 51. 
55 Ibid, 51. 
56 See Farah (2007) 230 CLR 89 at [161]-[163]. 
57 Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4727]. 
58 Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4734]. 
59 Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4737]. 
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assistance, then it follows that, in a case of knowing assistance where the sole assistance 
rendered is the receipt of trust property, it is both necessary and unnecessary for the 
fiduciary to act dishonestly. To resolve this paradox, it is submitted that one of the 
following must be true: 
 
a) ‘a degree of opprobrium’ is required on the part of the fiduciary in cases of 
knowing receipt; this seems unlikely following the failure of the High Court in 
Farah to address this as an element of knowing receipt; or 
b) contrary to the conclusion of Owen J in Bell Group, no element of dishonesty is 
necessary on the part breaching fiduciary, and the phrase ‘dishonest and 
fraudulent design’ is interpreted in the broadest sense to apply to all breaches of 
fiduciary duty; this formulation is, however, at odds with the inferences drawn 
by Owen J in Bell Group in relation to the High Court’s reasoning in Farah;60 or 
c) the two limbs of Barnes v Addy remain distinct and separate liabilities.  
 
Due to the difficulties noted with (a) and (b), it is submitted that conclusion (c) is the 
most likely position. 
 
A distinction between the two limbs of Barnes v Addy only becomes relevant insofar as 
it gives rise to different liabilities for knowing receipt versus knowing assistance. As 
Ridge argues, the justifications for the liability, in many cases, suggest the remedies 
available.61 If it is accepted that liability under both limbs of Barnes v Addy is a primary, 
fault based liability,62 any remedy in relation to knowing receipt is based on the third 
party’s wrongdoing in receiving property where it has knowledge that the property has 
been derived from a breach of trust; any remedy in relation to knowing receipt is based 
on the third party’s wrongdoing in assisting a dishonest and fraudulent design on the part 
of the fiduciary. While knowing assistance liability is dependent on the presence of 
some degree of dishonesty on the part of the breaching fiduciary, arguably, once this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 See Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4727]-[4728]. 
61 Ridge, above n 20, 446. 
62 The nature of third party liability is discussed further below at page 26, Justifying Third Party Liability.  
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dishonesty is present and third party liability arises, the dishonesty of the breaching 
fiduciary has no bearing on the question of the appropriate remedy in the circumstances.  
 
Additionally, as Owen J notes in Bell Group, there are bases other than those expressed 
in Barnes v Addy upon which a third party may become personally liable for 
involvement in a breach of trust or fiduciary duty.63 This avoids the unsatisfactory 
outcome of a third party who commits an equitable wrong escaping liability for their 
wrongdoing on a technicality; that is, simply because there has been no dishonesty on 
the party of the breaching trustee or fiduciary.  
 
The High Court in Farah maintained the position that a distinction could be drawn 
between the two limbs without addressing the debate surrounding the accuracy of this 
conclusion.64 As a result, while debate continues as to whether the two limbs should be 
considered distinct, the current position in Australian law is that the distinction between 
the two limbs remains. 
 
C The Extension of Barnes v Addy to Other Relationships 
 
While Lord Selborne used the word ‘agent’ in Barnes v Addy, liability under Barnes v 
Addy is not confined to agents in the strict sense and can extend to third parties who deal 
with trustees on their own behalf rather than as agents.65 Knowing assistance liability 
has also been extended to those who assist in breaches of fiduciary duty by fiduciaries 
other than trustees.66 The position is less certain in relation to knowing receipt liability 
where the property received is derived from a breach of fiduciary duty.67  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4627]. 
64 Farah (2007) 230 CLR 89 at [112]-[113]. 
65 Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4641]; Montagu’s Settlement Trusts, Re [1987] Ch 264. 
66 Farah (2007) 230 CLR 89 at [179]; Consul Development (1975) 132 CLR 373; Bell Group (2008) 39 
WAR 1 at [4641]. 
67 Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4635], [4711].  
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The traditional formulation of Lord Selborne in relation to knowing receipt requires the 
receipt of ‘trust property’.68 It is unclear whether company property, which by nature is 
not trust property in the strict sense, can be treated as ‘trust property’ for the purposes of 
Barnes v Addy in circumstances where a third party receives such property with 
knowledge of a breach of fiduciary duty.  
 
As noted in Bell Group, trust property is unique in that it involves the recognition of two 
distinct property interests not present in the case of property owned by a company in its 
own right.69 These two interests are the legal interest, vested in the trustee, and the 
beneficial interest, owned by the beneficiary, which itself is a form of proprietary 
interest capable of assignment.70 A company differs from a trust in that a company has 
its own legal personality, and is therefore the absolute owner of its own property.71 No 
person other than the company has any beneficial interest in company property, 
including a company director, who possesses neither a legal nor a beneficial interest.72  
 
In Bell Group, it was contended that, in order for a third party to be liable for knowing 
receipt in relation to a breach of trust in the strict sense, the third party must be aware 
that they are dealing with a trustee, and therefore must also be taken to be on notice that 
the trustee is not the absolute owner of the trust property concerned.73 It was argued that, 
as a recipient of company property is, by analogy, taken to know that the company is the 
absolute owner of its own property, the application of the same principle applied to 
knowing receipt of trust property in the strict sense to ‘bargains negotiated at arm’s 
length between major corporate entities’ is specious.74 
 
Owen J rejected this contention on the basis that the weight of authority suggested that 
‘trust property’ in a Barnes v Addy sense has a broader meaning than that of trust 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4711]. 
69 Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4751]. 
70 Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4751]. 
71 Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4752]. 
72 Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4752]. 
73 Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4753]. 
74 Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4753]. 
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property in the strict sense.75 In particular, his Honour noted the decision in Belmont 
Finance Corporation Ltd v Williams Furniture Ltd (No 2),76 where the English Court of 
Appeal considered the liability of third parties who received corporate property 
misapplied in a breach of fiduciary duty:77 
 
If a stranger to a trust (a) receives and become chargeable with some part of the trust fund or (b) 
assists the trustees of a trust with knowledge of the facts in a dishonest design on the part of the 
trustees to misapply some part of a trust fund, he is liable as a constructive trustee. 
 
A limited company is of course not a trustee of its own fund: it is their beneficial owner; but in 
consequence of the fiduciary character of their duties the directors of a limited company are 
treated as if they were trustees of those funds of the company which are in their hands or under 
their control, and if they misapply them they commit a breach of trust (citation omitted). So, if 
the directors of a company in breach of their fiduciary duties misapply the funds of their 
company so that they come into the hands of some stranger to the trust who receives them with 
knowledge (actual or constructive) of the breach, he cannot conscientiously retain those funds 
against the company unless he has some better equity. He becomes a constructive trustee for the 
company of the misapplied funds.78 
 
The Belmont Finance characterisation of corporate funds as trust property was applied 
by the Federal Court of Australia in Beach Petroleum NL v Johnson,79 when von Doussa 
J rejected an argument that no constructive trust arose in relation to money received in 
breach of fiduciary duty because the money in question was not strictly trust money.80 
Owen J in Bell Group recognised Beach Petroleum and other Australian authorities that 
have applied Belmont Finance, noting in particular the comments of Anderson J in 
Hancock Family Memorial Foundation Ltd v Porteous81 (which were upheld by the Full 
Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia on appeal):82 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4754].  
76 [1980] 1 All ER 393 (‘Belmont Finance’). 
77 Belmont Finance [1980] 1 All ER 393. 
78 Belmont Finance [1980] 1 All ER 393 at 405. 
79 (1993) 43 FCR 1 (‘Beach Petroleum’) at 50. 
80 Hugh Atkin, ‘Knowing Receipt Following Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd’ (2007) 
29(4) Sydney Law Review 713, 723. 
81 (1999) 151 FLR 191 (‘Hancock Family Memorial Foundation’). 
82 Hancock Family Memorial Foundation Ltd v Porteous (2000) 22 WAR 198 (‘Hancock’).  
 13	  
For the purposes of a general statement of the relevant principles, I take as the starting point to be 
that the directors of a company should be regarded as holding on trust any property or money of 
the company under their control. A director who misapplies the money or property of a company 
by causing the assets to be used for purposes which are not the purposes of the company acts in 
breach of trust. (References omitted).83 
 
Owen J also noted the decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Robins v 
Incentive Dynamics,84 where Mason P, referring to the passage cited above from 
Belmont Finance, stated that: 
 
[t]hese passages show how the Barnes v Addy principle can be applied to money which is not 
trust money in the strict sense at the time of its misapplication by directors acting in breach of 
their duties.85 
 
However, as Atkin notes, the High Court cautioned against such confident acceptance of 
the Belmont Finance position in Australia in Farah when it stated that:86  
 
‘[i]n recent times it has been assumed, but rarely if at all decided, that the first limb [of Barnes v 
Addy] applies not only to persons dealing with trustees, but also to persons dealing with at least 
some other types of fiduciary. 
 
The High Court was not required to determine the correctness of this assumption in 
Farah, instead leaving the question open for further consideration at a later date.87 Atkin 
notes that, rather than suggesting that the Belmont Finance approach to corporate 
property is incorrect, the High Court may have merely been cautioning lower courts 
against adopting a blanket assumption in relation to a question of law on which there is 
no clear authority.88 This interpretation of the High Court’s intention is consistent with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Hancock Family Memorial Foundation (1999) 151 FLR 191 at [72]; Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at 
[4765]. 
84 (2003) 175 FLR 286 (‘Robins’). 
85 Robins (2003) 175 FLR 286 at [64]; Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 22 at [4771]. 
86 Farah (2007) 230 CLR 89 at [113]. 
87 Farah (2007) 230 CLR 89 at [113]. 
88 Atkin, above n 80, 724. 
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its scathing indictment of the NSW Court of Appeal’s approach to the first instance 
Farah decision.89  
 
Owen J in Bell Group noted that approach of the High Court in Farah to the question of 
whether liability under the first limb of Barnes v Addy extended to breaches of fiduciary 
duty generally was contradictory.90 On the one hand, the court questioned whether 
‘fiduciary obligations’ attached to property received in considering whether the recipient 
may be charged with recipient liability, suggesting a broader formulation of the Barnes v 
Addy principle that could conceivably apply to company property.91 On the other hand, 
Owen J considered that the court reverted to a ‘more traditional formulation’ (that is, a 
concept of trust property in the strict sense) when it found that the same property was 
not ‘trust property’ nor the traceable proceeds of ‘trust property’ necessary to the 
liability.92   
 
In Bell Group, Owen J considered that the previous authority accepted Belmont Finance 
in Australian law and refused to depart from these decisions as a matter of comity in the 
absence of a concrete High Court decision.93 His Honour therefore concluded that the 
first limb of Barnes v Addy extends beyond trust property in the strict sense to include 
property to which fiduciary duty attaches.94  
 
Owen J suggested two potential bases as to how the extension of Barnes v Addy to 
corporate property misapplied in breach of fiduciary duty may be justified. The first 
concerned the analogy that may be drawn between the position of control that a trustee 
holds over trust property (in the strict sense) in relation to a beneficiary and the control 
that a company director holds over company property; a director who misapplies the 
property of a company for purposes that are not the purposes of the company may 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Ibid, 724. 
90 Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4711].  
91 Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4711]. 
92 Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4711].  
93 Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4772]-[4773]. 
94 Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4776]. 
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therefore be said to be acting in breach of ‘trust’.95 The second was concerned with the 
disposal of property to which fiduciary obligations attach; if the property is transferred 
to a third party in breach of these obligations, it may be considered ‘trust property’ 
within the extended meaning of the phrase.96 Importantly, Owen J considers that the 
outcome (that is, the liability of the third party who receives the property with 
knowledge) remains unchanged under either basis.97 
 
D The Required Level of Knowledge 
 
Debates have also raged as to what level and type of knowledge is required of a third 
party to give rise to liability under Barnes v Addy.98 Dietrich and Ridge note that the 
early authorities on Barnes v Addy liability were concerned with the ‘cognisance’ of the 
third party in relation to the breach of trust.99 In determining what level of cognisance 
would suffice to give rise to a liability on the part of a third party, the equitable rules of 
notice, encompassing actual, constructive and imputed notice, were adopted in the 
second half of the 20th century.100  
 
In Consul Development, the High Court considered that the knowledge requirement 
necessary to give rise to Barnes v Addy liability was centred on the court ascertaining the 
facts known to the third party about the trustee or fiduciary’s breach of duty.101 The 
debate in Consul Development centred on whether actual knowledge by the third party 
was necessary to give rise to liability, or whether constructive knowledge would suffice. 
Gibbs J considered that Barnes v Addy liability would be established where a person 
receiving trust property knew of the relevant breach of trust, or an honest and reasonable 
person with the same knowledge of the facts would have known of the breach.102 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4777]. 
96 Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4778]. 
97 Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4779]. 
98 Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4635]. 
99 Dietrich and Ridge, above n 20, 57. 
100 Ibid, 57; Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd v Cradock (No 3) [1968] 2 All ER 1073; Consul 
Development (1975) 132 CLR 373. 
101 Dietrich and Ridge, above n 20, 57. 
102 Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4659]. 
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Stephen J (with whom Barwick CJ agreed) considered that the knowledge of the third 
party had to relate specifically to a breach of fiduciary duty; it was not enough for the 
third party to merely have a sense of wrongdoing unrelated to an awareness of a possible 
breach of duty.103 Importantly, his Honour concluded that constructive notice of a breach 
of duty was insufficient to give rise to Barnes v Addy liability for knowing receipt.104 
 
Actual and constructive notice in relation to Barnes v Addy liability were reorganised in 
1992 by Peter Gibson J in Baden v Societe Generale pour Favoriser le Developpement 
du Commerce et de L’Industrie en Grance SA105 into five further categories of 
knowledge (known colloquially as the Baden scale):106 
 
(i) actual knowledge; 
(ii) wilful shutting of the eyes to the obvious; 
(iii) wilful and reckless failure to make inquiries that an honest and reasonable 
person would make; 
(iv) knowledge of circumstances that would indicate the facts to an honest and 
reasonable person; and 
(v) constructive notice. 
 
In England, the Baden scale was later rejected as the basis on which liability for third 
party participation in breaches of trust should be determined, first in Royal Brunei 
Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan107 in relation to knowing receipt, and then in Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd v Akindele108 in relation to knowing 
assistance.109 This rejection of the Baden scale occurred in the context of a move by the 
English courts away from considerations of the required levels of knowledge to an 
enquiry about whether the third party had themselves acted dishonestly.110 In Royal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4660]. 
104 Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4663]; Consul Development (1975) 132 CLR 373 at 412 (Stephen J). 
105 [1992] 4 All ER 161 (‘Baden’) at 235-238. 
106 Dietrich and Ridge, above n 20, 57. 
107 [1995] 2 AC 378 (‘Royal Brunei’). 
108 [2001] Ch 437. 
109 Grimaldi (2012) 287 ALR 22 at [263]. 
110 Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4665]. 
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Brunei, the Privy Council considered that a third party could be liable for dishonest 
procurement of or assistance in a breach of trust, even where the trustee themselves 
honestly believed that they were applying trust property in a way that was permissible or 
dealing with the trust property in good faith.111 While dishonesty was considered an 
essential element of accessory liability, it was the dishonesty of the third party, and not 
that of the breaching trustee, that was relevant.112 
 
In contrast to the English line of authority, the High Court in Farah endorsed the Baden 
scale as a useful tool,113 and applied it in determining that categories (i)-(iv), but not 
category (v), of the scale represented the level of knowledge required to attract knowing 
assistance liability in Australian law.114  
 
Their Honours in Farah also warned against an adoption by the lower Australian courts 
of the Royal Brunei formulation of accessory liability, noting that it was contrary to the 
position of the High Court in Consul Development.115 Their Honours’ stated that: 
 
whilst the different formulations of principle may lead to the same result in particular 
circumstances, there is a distinction between rendering liable a defendant participating with 
knowledge in a dishonest and fraudulent design, and rendering liable a defendant who 
dishonestly procures or assists in a breach of trust or fiduciary obligation where the trustee or 
fiduciary need not have engaged in a dishonest or fraudulent design.116  
 
The question of whether Royal Brunei displaced the decision of the High Court in 
Consul Development in relation to the formulation of the second limb of Barnes v Addy 
did not arise for consideration in Farah.117 The High Court warned, however, that 
Consul Development remains the law in Australia until, if ever, displaced by the High 
Court itself.118 As a result, Barnes v Addy knowing assistance liability in Australia 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4670]-[4671]; Royal Brunei [1995] 2 AC 378 at 384. 
112 Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4672]. 
113 Farah (2007) 230 CLR 89 at [174], [176]-[178]. 
114 Farah (2007) 230 CLR 89 at [177]-[178]. 
115 Farah (2007) 230 CLR 89 at [163]. 
116 Farah (2007) 230 CLR 89 at [163]. 
117 Farah (2007) 230 CLR 89 at [163]. 
118 Farah (2007) 230 CLR 89  at [163]. 
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requires a dishonest and fraudulent design on the part of the breaching fiduciary or 
trustee, and not merely dishonesty on the part of the assistant. 
 
The question of what level of knowledge sufficed to attract liability for knowing receipt 
remained open following Farah.119 One of the major reasons that uncertainty has 
prevailed in relation to this question is the two divergent rationales for recipient liability 
running through the case law: (i) the protection of the principal’s property interests in 
relation to the trust property; and (ii) redress for the third party’s participation in 
equitable wrongdoing.120 Dietrich and Ridge note that a property protection rationale 
justifies liability on the basis of constructive notice.121 However, where the rationale for 
liability is based on the third party’s participation in equitable wrongdoing, the relevant 
question becomes whether the defendant behaved wrongfully, and this suggests a 
stronger degree of cognition of the relevant breach is required.122  
 
Dietrich and Ridge argue for the equitable wrongdoing rationale, viewing knowing 
receipt as a subset of knowing assistance liability123 and as a result arguing that the same 
level of knowledge should be required for knowing receipt as for knowing assistance.124 
However, they warn against framing the question of third party liability purely on 
specific questions of the defendant’s notice or knowledge, and reject the use of the 
Baden scale in determining liability.125 Instead, they prefer the approach of the Privy 
Council in Royal Brunei.126 Dietrich and Ridge propose the development of: 
 
a general principle for participatory liability (encompassing knowing assistance and knowing 
receipt) that can be applied to a matrix of facts so as to give appropriate weight to factors such as 
the defendant’s cognisance of the breach, the nature of the defendant’s participation (for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 Grimaldi (2012) 287 ALR 22 at [262]-[263]; Dietrich and Ridge, above n 20, 62. 
120 Dietrich and Ridge, above n 20, 58. 
121 Ibid, 59. 
122 Ibid, 59. 
123 Ibid, 60. This is discussed further below at page 26, Justifying Third Party Liability. 
124 Dietrich and Ridge, above n 20, 60. 
125 Ibid, 60. 
126 Ibid, 60-61. 
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example, whether passive or active, procurement, facilitation or professional assistance), the 
degree of the defendant’s involvement and the defendant’s personal characteristics.127 
 
This approach focuses on the defendant’s conduct within the full factual matrix, which 
includes, but is not solely dependant on, the defendant’s level of knowledge.128 
However, Ridge and Dietrich concede that a contrary approach was taken by the High 
Court in Farah (which differentiated the ways in which liability may arise and 
maintained distinct requirements for each form of liability) and that this remains the 
current authority in Australia.129 
 
Shortly after the decision in Farah, and based primarily on an examination of Consul 
Development, Owen J concluded in Bell Group that the knowledge requirement is met in 
relation to knowing receipt where the third party: 
 
i. has actual knowledge of the trust and the misapplication of the trust property; or 
ii. has deliberately shut his or her eyes to those things; or 
iii. has abstained in a calculated way from making such enquiries as an honest and reasonable 
person would make, about the trust and the application of the trust property; or 
iv. knows of facts which to an honest and reasonable person would indicate the existence of the 
trusts and the fact of misapplication.130 
 
His Honour’s formulation therefore considers that the level of knowledge required to 
give rise to knowing receipt liability is the same as that required for knowing assistance; 
that is, levels (i)-(iv), but not level (v) of the Baden scale. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 Ibid, 61. 
128 Ibid, 61. 
129 Ibid, 61. 
130 Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4748]. 
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E The Rescission Requirement 
 
It appears that, in the case of a contract of loan or sale entered into in breach of fiduciary 
duty or trust, there is a need for the wronged principal to rescind the contract before 
proprietary relief may be granted in relation to the misapplied property.131 
 
In the case of Hancock Family Memorial Foundation Ltd v Porteous132 it was alleged 
that Hancock had caused companies controlled by him to pay money to Porteous for use 
by her in acquiring properties, and had breached fiduciary duties owed by him to the 
companies in doing so.133 It was found that no breach of fiduciary duty had taken place 
as the funds used were loans to Hancock that had since been discharged.134 Relevantly, it 
was also held that, on the basis of Daly v The Sydney Stock Exchange Ltd,135 no 
equitable remedy could have been granted even if there had been a breach of fiduciary 
duty, as the contracts, which would have been voidable had there been a breach of 
fiduciary duty, had not been rescinded and had in fact been discharged.136  
 
In Daly, the plaintiff sought some advice from a firm of stockbrokers, Patricks, in 
relation to some money that he wished to invest in shares. In breach of fiduciary duty, an 
employee of Patricks convinced Daly to lend the money to Patricks, who at the time 
were in a precarious financial situation. Patricks subsequently became insolvent and was 
unable to repay the loan to Daly. Daly attempted to recover compensation from a fidelity 
fund but was unable to do so as he had not rescinded the loan contract.137  
 
On appeal to the High Court, Gibbs CJ (with whom Wilson and Dawson JJ agreed) 
found that, while Patricks owed and breached a fiduciary duty to Daly, this was not 
enough to establish the liability of the fidelity fund. Instead, Daly needed to establish 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 R Meagher, D Heydon and M Leeming, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity Doctrines and 
Remedies (LexisNexis Butterworths, 4th ed, 2002) [5-270]. 
132 Hancock (2000) 22 WAR 198. 
133 Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4787]. 
134 Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4784]-[4785]. 
135 (1986) 160 CLR 371 (‘Daly’). 
136 Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4784]-[4785]. 
137 Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4786]-[4787]. 
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that Patricks had received the money for or on behalf of him, or as a trustee.138 Daly 
argued that Patricks held the money as a constructive trustee as they had received it in 
breach of duty. Gibbs CJ concluded that the benefit obtained by Patricks as a result of 
the breach of duty was a loan, which it was bound to repay to Daly. The ordinary legal 
remedies available to a creditor were sufficient to prevent Patricks from benefitting from 
the breach of duty, and the imposition of a constructive trust could lead to unjust 
consequences in relation to both creditors of Patricks, and Patricks itself.139  
 
The Full Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia in Hancock considered it to 
be clear from the reasoning of Gibbs CJ that a constructive trust is not automatically 
imposed upon money lent in circumstances that give rise to a breach of fiduciary duty.140 
While a constructive trust may be awarded as a discretionary remedy, such a remedy 
will not be granted where it is beyond what is necessary to do equity in the 
circumstances.141 
 
In Daly, Brennan J (with whom Wilson J agreed) considered that, where a fiduciary 
receives property from the principal in circumstances where the transfer of property 
constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty, the transaction is voidable, not void.142 If the 
principal chooses to avoid the contract by rescinding it, the fiduciary will hold the 
property on constructive trust for the principal. The principal may then assert title to the 
property or trace it. However, the principal cannot at once leave the contract on foot and 
deny the borrowers title to the property concerned.143 As the Full Court of the Supreme 
Court of Western Australia explained in Hancock: 
 
It stands to reasons that a party who lends money to another under a voidable contract of loan 
must avoid the contract before asserting equitable title to the money lent and before seeking relief 
against third parties by way of tracing. Were that not to be so, the lender would notionally be able 
to claim repayment of the moneys due as a debt under the contract, and at the same time recover, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 Daly (1986) 160 CLR 371 at 377 (Gibbs J). 
139 Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4787]-[4788]. 
140 Hancock (2000) 22 WAR 198 at [177]; Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4788]. 
141 Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4788]; Hancock (2000) 22 WAR 198 at [177]. 
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by equitable remedies, from the borrower, or third parties with knowledge or volunteers, property 
acquired through the money lent. Such a situation… would give rise to consequences unjust to 
the borrower and would unfairly benefit the lender.144 
 
As their Honours noted in Grimaldi, Daly was not a case involving the receipt of 
property by a knowing third party and did not consider Barnes v Addy type liabilities. 145 
It appears that the rescission requirement was extended to knowing receipt cases in 
Greater Pacific Investments Pty Ltd (in liq) v Australian National Industries Ltd,146 
where McLelland AJA stated: 
 
[i]n general, where there is a contract for the sale of property by A to B made in breach of a 
fiduciary duty owed to A by B (or by C in whose breach B knowingly participated), pursuant to 
which the legal title to the property has been transferred from A to B, the transaction is in equity 
voidable at the instance of A, who may (if necessary) obtain an order for rescission setting it 
aside. Unless and until A effectively avoids the transaction and (if necessary) obtains an order for 
rescission, B’s property rights as a result of the transaction remain unaffected. However if A does 
effectively avoid the transaction and (if necessary) obtain an order for rescission, the parties will 
be treated in equity as if the transaction had never been effected; in other words equity will treat 
B as if he had held the property in trust for A, that is, as a constructive trustee, ab initio. A 
constructive trust arises in such circumstances as a consequence of the effective avoidance or 
rescission of the transaction. Where, for whatever reason, the transaction has not been and cannot 
be effectively avoided and rescission is unavailable, it remains effective and no constructive trust 
can arise.147 
 
F Personal v Proprietary Remedies 
 
While Lord Selborne’s use of the language ‘constructive trustee’ in Barnes v Addy may 
suggest otherwise, the liability under both limbs of Barnes v Addy is a personal one; the 
‘constructive trusteeship’ of the third party recipient or assistant is merely a vehicle by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Hancock (2000) 22 WAR 198 at [183]-[184]; Bell Group (2008) 39 WAR 1 at [4791]. 
145 Grimaldi (2012) 287 ALR 22 at [278]. 
146 (1996) 39 NSWLR 143 (‘Greater Pacific Investments’). 
147 Greater Pacific Investments (1996) 39 NSWLR 143 at 153; Grimaldi (2012) 287 ALR 22 at [279]. 
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which a personal remedy, such as an account of profits or equitable compensation, may 
be sought by the wronged principal against the third party.148  
 
Their Honours in Grimaldi noted the ‘latent ambiguity’ in the use of the term 
‘constructive trustee’:149 
 
In its strictest sense it refers to a person who, as a constructive trustee, holds specific property on 
trust for another. In its more general sense it can refer to a person who, whether or not he or she 
holds or has received, trust property, has so acted as to be exposed potentially to the same 
remedial consequences for his or her actions as would be a trustee who had acted similarly, ie 
that person as “a constructive trustee” may in appropriate circumstances be decreed, for example, 
to hold specific property as a constructive trustee, to be subject to an account of profits, or to be 
liable to pay compensation etc: see eg Consul Development, at 396-397. This latter usage is 
particularly prevalent both in claims against fiduciaries for breach of fiduciary duty or for misuse 
of fiduciary position and in Barnes v Addy claims where, having been described as being liable as 
a constructive trustee, personal relief only is awarded.150 
 
Flowing from this, it is important to note that a distinction exists between remedies in 
property and personal remedies available against third parties in relation to property 
received with knowledge of a breach of duty. A knowing recipient in the property sense, 
and not the Barnes v Addy sense, will be liable to make specific restitution to the 
principal for such of the trust property, or its traceable proceeds, which remain in his or 
her hands.151 As their Honours in Grimaldi note, while this type of claim may potentially 
be available in Barnes v Addy type knowing receipt case, it is a distinct and separate 
liability, and essentially a claim to priority.152 Barnes v Addy liability for knowing 
receipt gives rise to a personal liability on the part of the third party recipient.153  
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Dietrich and Ridge explain further that, in a situation where a third party receives trust 
property as a result of a fiduciary’s breach of duty with knowledge, the wronged 
principal has several primary means of redress against the third party: 
 
1. a claim asserting the principal’s equitable proprietary interest on the basis of 
either: 
a. priority rules (where the principal claims that their first-in-time interest 
over the trust property takes priority over the defendant’s later-acquired 
interest); or 
b. tracing rules (where the principal claims that the value inherent in the 
original trust property can be traced into mixed or substituted property 
now held by the defendant); 
2. a personal claim asserting that the defendant knowingly received either the trust 
property itself, or property into which the value of the original trust property can 
be traced (ie, a claim based on the first limb of Barnes v Addy);  
3. a claim asserting that the defendant knowingly assisted in the fiduciary’s breach 
of trust (ie, a claim based on the second limb of Barnes v Addy).154 
 
The first claim above gives rise to proprietary remedies, while the second and third give 
rise to personal remedies.155 In regard to the first claim, the priority rules apply where 
the nature of the property in question has not changed.156 Conversely, the tracing rules 
apply to determine whether the equitable proprietary rights of the principal survive in 
property now held by the defendant that has been either mixed with, or substituted for, 
the original trust property.157 
 
Both the proprietary and personal liabilities in a case of knowing receipt relate to 
property or its traceable proceeds that once belonged to the claimant. These liabilities 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 Dietrich and Ridge, above n 20, 51. Note that the third claim listed here is controversial in relation to 
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the view that knowing receipt liability is merely a subset of a broader knowing assistance liability.  
155 Dietrich and Ridge, above n 20, 52. 
156 Ibid, 52. 
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are distinct from cases of knowing assistance not involving the receipt of trust property, 
in which the claimant may seek to have a constructive trust imposed by way of remedy 
over property derived by the third party of their own accord as a result of a breach of 
duty.158  
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III JUSTIFYING THIRD PARTY LIABILITY 
 
Some of the uncertainty that exists in Australian law in relation to Barnes v Addy 
liability can perhaps be attributed to a divergence of opinions as to the justifications for 
third party liability in relation to breaches of fiduciary duty. As Ridge notes, answering 
the question of why a remedy is warranted will, to a large extent, suggest the appropriate 
remedy.159 
 
A Rationales for Third Party Liability 
 
Ridge outlines both principled and pragmatic rationales for third party liability. The 
principled rationale is based on equity’s concern in relation to the wrongful conduct of 
the third party, whereas the pragmatic rationales are concerned with providing a 
wronged fiduciary with an alternative means of recourse where none can be sought 
against the breaching fiduciary; and deterring third party participation in breaches of 
trust or fiduciary duty.160 Ridge notes that the pragmatic rationales reflect the ‘strongly 
prophylactic’ nature of fiduciary obligation;161 that is, the fiduciary is discouraged from 
using his or her position of trust and confidence in a manner inconsistent with the 
interests of the principal, hence bolstering the protection provided by the law to the 
principals of fiduciary relationships.162 
 
Ridge argues that the remedies available for third party participation in a breach of 
fiduciary duty should depend primarily on the nature of the wrongdoing that equity aims 
to address, rather than the pragmatic rationales.163 The pragmatic aspects of the rationale 
remain relevant, however, in strengthening the justification given by the principled 
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rationale, and determining the bounds within which the principle-based remedy 
operates.164 
 
B Primary or Secondary Liability? 
 
Elliot and Mitchell argue that third party liability in breaches of duty is a secondary 
liability, resembling the accessorial liability of those who aid, abet, counsel or procure a 
crime.165 The third party’s liability derives from and duplicates the liability of the 
breaching fiduciary (the primary wrongdoer) in whose acts the third party participates. 
‘Participation’ in this sense involves inducing the fiduciary to commit, conspiring with 
the fiduciary to commit, or assisting the fiduciary to commit, a breach of fiduciary 
duty.166 As the third party is liable for the same wrong as the breaching fiduciary, the 
liability of the third party is joint and equal to that of the fiduciary.167 
 
Ridge disagrees, instead arguing in favour of a model of primary liability for the third 
party, based on their own wrongdoing and not that of the breaching fiduciary.168 The 
wrongdoing of the third party in this case is the exploitation of the principal’s 
vulnerability, which arises as a consequence of the fiduciary relationship.169 Under this 
model, at the very least the third party is required to compensate the principal for any 
loss suffered by the principal as a result of the third party’s own wrongdoing.170  
 
It is submitted that, in light of the principled and practical rationales for third party 
liability discussed above, Ridge’s model of a primary liability based on equitable 
wrongdoing is preferable to Elliot and Mitchell’s secondary liability model. 
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C Is a Third Party Required to Account for Profits? 
 
Ridge questions whether it may be justifiable to require a third party involved in a 
breach of duty to account for benefits obtained by them personally as a result of their 
participation in a breach? On the one hand, unlike the breaching fiduciary, the third 
party has not undertaken any obligation of loyalty to the principal.171 However, where 
the third party has exploited the vulnerability of the principal by dishonestly interfering 
with the fiduciary relationship for their own benefit, Ridge argues that a significant 
equitable wrong has been committed by the third party, justifying stripping the third 
party of any benefit obtained as a result of the wrongdoing.172 The pragmatic role of 
third party liability in deterring breaches of fiduciary duty provides further justification 
for requiring the third party to account for any profits flowing from the breach.173  
 
Ridge argues that the principled rationale of intervention in an equitable wrong and the 
practical rationale of deterrence justify stripping a third party of profits even in some 
cases where the principal has not suffered a loss as a result of the breach of duty.174 
However, the culpability of the third party in the circumstances, or the close relationship 
between the third party and breaching fiduciary, must warrant the stripping of the third 
party’s profits in such cases.175 
 
D Can a Proprietary Remedy by Ordered Against a Third Party? 
 
Given that the principled and pragmatic rationales of third party liability discussed 
above could all seemingly be met by imposing the personal liabilities of account of 
profits and equitable compensation, Ridge questions whether there are ever any 
circumstances in which a proprietary remedy against a third party might be warranted;176 
that is, are there circumstances in which the court may be justified in imposing a 	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constructive trust over property or profits derived by the third party as a result of the 
breach.177  
 
The most apparent benefit of a proprietary remedy is a priority that the wronged 
principal secures as a result of the proprietary interest over unsecured creditors in the 
case of insolvency of the third party.178 Despite this, Ridge noted that the Australian line 
of cases involving the contemplation or award of a proprietary remedy have been 
concerned not with the potential insolvency of the third party, but instead with 
redressing the wrongdoing of the third party in relation to the principal.179 Additionally, 
prioritising the rights of third parties against unsecured creditors has no deterrent effect 
on third party participation in breaches of fiduciary duty, disrupts the operation of 
statutory insolvency schemes, and disadvantages innocent unsecured creditors.180 
 
Ridge argues, however, that alternative rationales may justify the imposition of 
proprietary remedies in some cases.181 For example, a proprietary remedy may be 
justified where it provides a more straightforward means of ensuring that the principal is 
not disadvantaged by the third party’s wrongdoing, such as where the principal may 
have made better use of a corporate opportunity wrongfully exploited by a third party.182 
In this situation, accurately calculating the loss of the principal is likely to be difficult, 
and an account of profits made by the third party is unlikely to fully reflect the loss of 
the principal.183 Imposing a constructive trust in these circumstances (with an 
appropriate allowance provided to the knowing assistance to reflect the efforts and 
expenditure of the knowing assistant to date) would allow the principal to exploit the 
corporate opportunity for their own benefit.184  
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Another situation in which a proprietary remedy may be justified is where the knowing 
participant is a company created to dishonestly assist the fiduciary to divert the 
principal’s business to the company.185 In these circumstances, the company itself may 
be wholly referable to the breach of duty and wrongdoing of the knowing participant. In 
such circumstances, a constructive trust over the company (with just allowances made 
for the expenses, effort and skills of the third party) may be the most effective 
remedy.186 Ridge notes, however, that a constructive trust will not be an appropriate 
remedy in circumstances where, as in Warman International Ltd v Dwyer,187 the success 
of the company is substantially attributable to the skill and efforts of the breaching 
fiduciary and third party, and the business opportunity is not one that would have been 
pursued by the principal.188 
 
Finally, a constructive trust may be an appropriate remedy in relation to a third party’s 
participation where the property obtained as a result of the third party’s wrongdoing is 
no longer identifiable in their hands, but can be traced into property held by another who 
is not a bona fide purchaser for value,189 such as in Attorney General for Hong Kong v 
Reid.190 In these circumstances, the principal is limited to the award of a personal 
remedy against the third party participant, but may be able to assert a proprietary interest 
in the property now held by the other party.191 
 
E Can a Proprietary Remedy Be Ordered Where the Property of the Principal Cannot 
Be Traced Into a Third Party’s Hands? 
 
Ridge questions whether the principal can claim proprietary rights over property held by 
a third party on the basis of their wrongful participation in a breach of fiduciary duty, in 
circumstances where the principal’s property cannot be traced into the property currently 
held by the third party; that is, where no proprietary link exists between the principal’s 	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property, and that held by the third party.192 A constructive trust in this sense would be 
remedial, as such an order would involve the court granting a proprietary right to 
someone who previously had no such right.193 This differs to an institutional 
constructive trust, which is considered to have existed from the time of the breach giving 
rise to it; the court’s role in relation to an institutional constructive trust involves 
‘recognising’ as versus imposing, the proprietary right.194 An institutional constructive 
trust may be recognised by the court, for example, where trust property misapplied in 
breach of trust can be traced into the hands of the third party who has received the 
property with knowledge. 
 
Ridge notes that the distinction between institutional and remedial constructive trusts in 
Australia is blurred,195 with the institutional/remedial distinction seen as ‘connoting a 
remedial spectrum rather than a remedial dichotomy’.196 Both versions of the 
constructive trust were originally considered remedial responses to particular equitable 
wrongdoings, with institutional trusts merely becoming ‘institutional’ via repeated 
judicial recognition and usage.197 While the institutional trust may be considered to have 
existed ‘in the shadows’ prior to recognition by the court, Ridge considers that an 
element of discretion still remains in relation to the court’s recognition of its 
existence.198 Likewise, the court retains a discretion as to whether to impose a remedial 
constructive trust.199 Ridge notes, however, that the court’s discretion may be 
constrained by recognised principles relating to its exercise.200  
 
While proprietary remedies in relation to third party participation in breaches of trust or 
fiduciary duty are available in Australia at the court’s discretion and have been 
awarded,201 Ridge notes that there is a great deal of uncertainty as to how the court’s 	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discretion to award a proprietary remedy in these circumstances may be exercised.202 
Ridge suggests that this is the result of the evolving nature of the jurisdiction, rather than 
any reluctance on the part of the Australian judiciary to set boundaries to the remedial 
discretion.203 Ridge outlines a set of principles related to the exercise of the discretion 
that may be ‘glean[ed] from the current authorities’: 
 
1. The least intrusive proprietary remedy should be awarded, with the first question 
always being, ‘having regard to the issues in the litigation, is there an appropriate 
equitable remedy which falls short of the imposition of a trust?’: Giumelli v 
Giumelli.204 
 
2. The interests of innocent third parties, including unsecured creditors, must be 
protected (although it is not clear whether this requires the refusal of a 
proprietary remedy altogether where the interests of innocent third parties would 
be adversely impacted upon): Muschinski v Dodds;205 Giumelli v Giumelli.206 
 
3. The court retains a residual discretion to refuse a proprietary remedy on 
established grounds, such as laches: Chan v Zacharia;207 Warman.208 
 
Based on these principles, Ridge suggests that a constructive trust may be imposed, and 
should only be imposed, against a third party participant where: 
 
1. the proprietary remedy will be the most effective way to redress the wrong of the 
third party and would not be otherwise available;209 and 
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2. the proprietary remedy can be framed so as to protect the interests of third parties 
(meaning that a constructive trust should not be awarded where the third party is 
insolvent and the contest becomes between the principal and unsecured 
creditors).210 
 
F Should Liability be Joint or Several? 
 
1 Liability for the Losses of the Principal 
 
Ridge argues that, if a third party’s liability in relation to a breach of fiduciary duty or 
trust is a primary liability based on their own wrongdoing, they should be liable only for 
the losses ‘caused’ by this wrongdoing.211 Once it has been established that the third 
party has been a ‘cause-in-fact’ of the losses of the principal or beneficiary, the court 
should consider the appropriate scope of liability for the third party as a normative 
question.212 However, once it is found that the third party has been involved in a breach 
of trust or duty, they are instead held jointly and severally liable with the breaching 
fiduciary or trustee for all of the losses of the principal or trustee arising from the 
breach.213 The difficulty with this is that it can result in the third party being liable for 
extensive losses even where their wrongdoing may have been relatively minor compared 
to the wrongdoing of the breaching fiduciary or trustee.214 
 
Despite this difficulty, Ridge considers generally that joint and several liability for third 
party involvement in a breach of duty or trust can be justified on two bases.215 Firstly, 
joint and several liability is consistent with the principles of fiduciary law generally, 
which are based on the discouragement of actions on the part of the fiduciary which are 
inconsistent with the position of trust and confidence they occupy in relation to the 
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principal.216 For third party liability to arise, there must be wrongdoing on the part of the 
third party. In the eyes of equity, this wrongdoing may be significant enough to warrant 
the third party bearing the risk of full liability for the losses of the principal.217 Secondly, 
the joint and several liability of the third party is only in relation to the principal; the 
breaching fiduciary may be liable to the third party for a contribution towards the full 
liability, hence providing some protection to the third party where their contribution to 
the wrongdoing has been relatively minor compared to the actions of the breaching 
fiduciary.218 
 
2 Liability for the Gains of the Wrongdoers 
 
Under a fault based, primary liability model, Ridge notes that the remedies available 
against the third party should focus on the wrongdoing of the third party themselves, and 
the third party should not be liable for gains made by the breaching fiduciary.219 
However, Ridge notes that it is possible to conceive of some instances where the joint 
liability of the third party for gains made by the breaching fiduciary may be justifiable. 
These include circumstances where the fiduciary is controlled by the third party and acts 
merely vehicle for the enrichment of the third party.220  
 
Ridge considers, however, that joint and several liability for third parties in all instances 
would likely be ‘penal’, in that it would go beyond what is necessary to fulfil the 
pragmatic and principled rationales of liability, and may in fact amount to a punitive 
measure against the third party.221 
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IV CHAMELEON MINING NL v MURCHISON METALS LTD222 
 
A Factual Background 
 
Chameleon Mining NL was a start-up mining company incorporated in November 2001 
and listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (“ASX”) in April 2003. In November 
2007, Chameleon lodged claims in the Federal Court of Australia against their former 
managing director, Gregory Barnes, and an alleged de facto or shadow director, Phillip 
Grimaldi, alleging breaches of fiduciary and statutory duties owed to Chameleon.223 The 
alleged breaches related to a number of transactions involving Chameleon over the 
course of 2001 – 2004, notably the Cadetta and Cheques transactions outlined below.  
 
Chameleon also claimed that three companies, Winterfall (later known as Crosslands 
Resources Ltd), Murchison Metals Ltd (formerly known as Weboz Ltd and NiCu Metals 
Ltd) and Pinnacle Nominees Pty Ltd, were liable as knowing recipients and/or assistants 
to the breaches of fiduciary duty and/or accessories under the Corporations Act. 
Grimaldi was a director and the controlling mind of Murchison.224 Pinnacle Nominees 
was owned and controlled by Barnes.225 
 
Barnes and Pinnacle Nominees settled the claims against them without an admission of 
liability prior to the end of the trial, for an agreed payment of $6,000,000 to 
Chameleon.226 
 
At first instance, Grimaldi was found to be a de facto director of Chameleon. 
Importantly, Jacobs J concluded that, regardless of whether Grimaldi was a de facto 
director under the Corporations Act, his relationship with Chameleon in relation to the 
impugned transactions gave rise to fiduciary duties, which Grimaldi subsequently 	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breached.227 Barnes had also breached fiduciary duties owed to Chameleon. Both 
Murchison and Winterfall were held liable as knowing recipients of Chameleon funds 
misapplied by Barnes and Grimaldi in breach duty. Murchison was also found to be a 
knowing assistant in relation to these breaches.  
 
1 The Iron Jack Deal 
 
In February 2004, Winterfall negotiated the purchase a set of iron ore tenements in 
Western Australia (the ‘Iron Jack’ tenements) from a group of third party vendors.228 
Winterfall agreed to pay the vendors of the tenements via a series of instalments, but fell 
short of funds and became unable to complete payment of the second instalment.229 A 
director and majority shareholder of Winterfall, Zuks, knew Grimaldi and Barnes from 
previous dealings and met with them in relation to the purchase of the Iron Jack 
tenements in about April 2004.230 It was agreed at this meeting that Murchison would 
provide the funds necessary for Winterfall to complete the second instalment payment in 
return for an interest in the Iron Jack project.231 Zuks negotiated an extension of time for 
payment of the second instalment with the Iron Jack vendors until early June 2004.232 As 
part of the negotiated extension, Winterfall agreed that, should the June deadline not be 
met, the Iron Jack tenements would return to the Iron Jack vendors, and no payment 
made to date would be refunded.233 
 
A Heads of Agreement was executed between Murchison and Winterfall.234 Under the 
terms of the agreement, Murchison was to pay the $350,000 remaining due in relation to 
the second instalment payment to the Iron Jack vendors, and subsequently effect a 
reverse takeover of Winterfall through an exchange of shares.235 As part of the deal, 	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Zuks agreed to pay an additional fee (the ‘spotter’s fee’) to Barnes and Grimaldi,236 
which consisted of shares in Winterfall that could later be exchanged for shares in 
Murchison following the completion of the reverse takeover.237 The payment of the 
spotter’s fee was dependent upon the payment of the $350,000 by Murchison in relation 
to the second of the Iron Jack instalment payments.238 
 
In breach of the Heads of Agreement, Murchison failed to pay the $350,000 when it 
became due.239 As a result, Winterfall was in danger of being unable to complete the 
second instalment payment, and consequently of losing the $100,000 invested in the 
purchase to date and the option to complete the purchase of the tenements.240 Grimaldi 
was confident that he could secure funds for the payment and asked Zuks to wait. Zuks 
agreed and was able to negotiate a further extension of time with the Iron Jack vendors 
until 1 July 2004.241  
 
By mid-July, Murchison had still not paid the agreed money to the Iron Jack vendors.242 
The vendors sent a fax to Winterfall on 22 July stating that the negotiation period had 
come to an end, and that they were now dealing with other offers.243 Urgent discussions 
took place between Grimaldi and Zuks.244 Grimaldi sent a fax to Zuks stating that 
Murchison had made available ‘via Chameleon Mining NL’ a total of $318,000, and had 
a further $32,000 plus GST of $35,000 ready to be paid.245 Zuks forwarded this fax to 
the Iron Jack vendors on the same day.246 The vendors allowed Winterfall until 5pm the 
following day to present cheques for the full amount.247  
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Zuks made the payment to the Iron Jack vendors prior to the expiry of the deadline.248 
Included in the payment were cheque funds sourced from Chameleon’s accounts to the 
value of $152,750, plus $125,090 in funds raised by Murchison through the sale of 
Chameleon shares received by Grimaldi as a commission in relation to the Cadetta 
transaction.249 These transactions are outlined below. 
 
Winterfall completed its purchase of the Iron Jack tenements and Murchison’s reverse 
takeover of Winterfall was effected in November 2004.250 Winterfall’s shareholders 
were provided with 80 million shares and 30 million options in Murchison in exchange 
for their Winterfall shares.251 10 million of these shares and 12 million of the options 
were issued to Barnes and Grimaldi (or for their benefit) in exchange for the spotter’s 
fee that they had received following Murchison’s payment of $350,000 to the Iron Jack 
vendors.252 
 
2 The Cadetta Transaction 
 
In May 2004, Chameleon entered into a deal to purchase four mining interests known as 
the Cadetta tenements for an exchange of shares in Chameleon.253 Grimaldi, who had 
been assisting Chameleon with fundraising for some time, was closely involved with the 
deal.254 The Cadetta tenements were purchased for 8 million shares in Chameleon, with 
a further 5 million Chameleon shares payable to Grimaldi as a commission for 
introducing the Cadetta transaction to Chameleon.255 Grimaldi arranged for these 5 
million shares to be paid to Murchison,256 and organised their sale as soon as they had 
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been transferred. An amount of $125,090 raised from the sales was then used by 
Murchison to assist with its payment to the Iron Jack vendors.257 
 
3 The Cheques Transactions 
 
Chameleon only had a small amount of cash available in its account at the start of July 
(approximately $4,700 on 5 July 2004).258 Despite this, either or both Barnes and 
Grimaldi told Zuks that Chameleon would be meeting some of the payments due to the 
Iron Jack vendors.259 
 
On 8 July 2004, a resolution was circulated amongst the directors of Chameleon stating 
that it had been resolved to pay Murchison a short-term loan in the amount of 
$56,500.260 Barnes drew a cheque for $56,250 on Chameleon’s account on 9 July 2004, 
payable to one of the Iron Jack vendors.261 The cheque was initially dishonoured due to 
insufficient funds in Chameleon’s account, but cleared when re-presented later in 
July.262 Grimaldi, on behalf of Murchison, requested another ‘loan’ from Chameleon in 
mid-July.263 Barnes subsequently drew a second cheque from Chameleon’s funds for the 
amount of $96,500 in favour of another Iron Jack vendor in late July.264  
 
A total of $152,750 (the combined value of the two cheques) was debited from 
Chameleon’s bank account on 29 July 2004.265 The only possible source of funding for 
the cheques was found to be from a placement that Grimaldi was organising on 
Chameleon’s behalf for the purpose of the exploration of an unrelated gold mine.266 
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B The Findings of Jacobson J 
 
Chameleon claimed that Grimaldi and Barnes had devised the Cadetta transaction for the 
improper purpose of siphoning funds from Chameleon to assist Murchison in meeting its 
obligations to Winterfall.267 While this claim was unsuccessful, his Honour found that 
the commission constituted a personal benefit or gain obtained by Grimaldi by reason of 
his fiduciary position in relation to Chameleon.268 As Grimaldi had arranged for the 
shares to be paid to Murchison, Murchison was found to be a knowing recipient of the 
Chameleon funds, and a knowing assistant in relation to Grimaldi’s breach of fiduciary 
duty.269 As the controlling mind of Murchison, Grimaldi’s actual knowledge that he was 
not entitled to retain the commission or apply it for Murchison’s benefit was attributable 
to Murchison.270 Grimaldi’s actions did not constitute a fraud on Murchison as they were 
at least partly of benefit to Murchison (as they assisted Murchison to meet obligations to 
Winterfall under the Heads of Agreement).271 
 
His Honour found that Murchison was also a knowing recipient of the Chameleon 
cheque funds that had been misapplied by Barnes and Grimaldi in breach of duty.272 
While Chameleon had paid the funds to Winterfall and not Murchison, they had done so 
for Murchison’s benefit. As a result, the cheques passed through Murchison’s hands,273 
satisfying the element of receipt.274 As the controlling mind of Murchison, Grimaldi’s 
actual knowledge that the cheque funds were misapplied was imputed to Murchison.275 
The drawing of the cheques could not be considered to be a fraud on Murchison by 
Grimaldi because the transaction was partly for Murchison’s benefit.276 
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Murchison was also liable as a knowing assistant for assisting the dishonest and 
fraudulent design of Barnes and Grimaldi in relation to the receipt of the spotter’s fee, 
which his Honour considered was an illicit commission.277 Murchison possessed actual 
knowledge of the dishonest and fraudulent design as a result of the actual knowledge of 
Grimaldi.278 
 
Finally, Murchison was liable under sections 79(a) and (c) of the Corporations Act for 
aiding and abetting, and being knowingly concerned in, Barnes’ contraventions of 
sections 181 and 182 of the Corporations Act, due to Grimaldi’s actual knowledge of all 
of the essential elements of Barnes’ contraventions.279 
 
Winterfall was found to be a knowing recipient of the Chameleon cheque funds 
misapplied by Barnes and Grimaldi in breach of duty. In respect of Barnes and 
Grimaldi’s breaches of duty, Zuks was considered at the very least to have had 
knowledge of circumstances which would indicate the facts to an honest and reasonable 
man; that is, knowledge falling within category (iv) of the Baden scale.280 Zuks’ 
knowledge as a director of Winterfall was imputed to Winterfall. As the cheques passed 
through Zuks’ hands and were delivered to him by the Iron Jack vendors to meet part of 
Winterfall’s liability under the Iron Jack agreement, the element of receipt of trust 
property was met.281  
 
His Honour concluded that Winterfall was also liable as an accessory under section 79 
of the Corporations Act as a result of Zuks’ actual knowledge of breaches by Grimaldi 
and Barnes of duties owed under the Act.282 
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Chameleon claimed a constructive trust or an account of profits (at its election) from 
Murchison in relation to Murchison’s 100% shareholding in Winterfall, or alternatively 
over a percentage interest equivalent to the amount that the proceeds of the Chameleon 
cheques and Cadetta shares sale represented in relation to the total consideration 
provided by Winterfall for the acquisition of the Iron Jack tenements (which equated to 
approximately 24%).283 Chameleon also claimed a constructive trust over the 10 million 
shares issued as the spotter’s fee.284 Alternatively, Chameleon claimed equitable 
compensation.285 
 
His Honour concluded that the imposition of a constructive trust over Murchison’s 
shares in Winterfall was clearly not an appropriate remedy, as the shares were neither 
the profit nor the property obtained by Murchison as a result of Barnes and Grimaldi’s 
breaches.286 While the nature of the benefit received by Murchison as a result of its 
involvement in the breaches of Barnes and Grimaldi was difficult to determine precisely, 
his Honour considered that Chameleon’s funds had been mixed with the funds of 
Murchison and applied in partial discharge of Murchison’s obligations towards 
Winterfall.287 Murchison did not acquire a specific item of property as such, but instead 
obtained the benefit of being able to complete its transaction with Winterfall and 
subsequently gain an interest in the Iron Jack project.288 His Honour characterised the 
benefit as an investment in the working capital of Winterfall in accordance with the 
Murchison/Winterfall Heads of Agreement.289  
 
While Murchison did later acquire a 100% shareholding in Winterfall, the Heads of 
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to purchase them. Likewise, the Heads of Agreement did not outline the consideration 
payable by Murchison for the shares, and there was substantial further debate between 
Murchison and Winterfall in relation to this over September and October of 2004.290 As 
a result, there was an insufficient causal nexus between the acquisition of Winterfall by 
Murchison and the breaches of fiduciary duty, barring the imposition of a constructive 
trust on an application of the profit principle.291 Likewise, a constructive trust could not 
be imposed on an application of the rules of equitable tracing, as the shares in Winterfall 
were not a substitute for the misapplied Chameleon funds.292  
 
Murchison was instead required to account for profits obtained as a result of its 
participation in Barnes and Grimaldi’s breaches of duty.293 His Honour ordered an 
accounting of all the funds that Murchison or its subsidiaries invested in the Iron Jack 
project from the time that the Chameleon funds were improperly obtained, and a 
calculation of the net profits derived from the venture.294 Chameleon was entitled to a 
portion of that income referable to the amount of $277,840 (being the total funds of 
which it had been deprived as a result of the Cheques transaction and Cadetta 
transaction), as well as the repayment of that amount itself if not already received.295 
Murchison was not liable to account for the profits of Barnes and Grimaldi derived from 
the spotter’s fee.296 
 
Murchison was also ordered to compensate Chameleon under section 1317H(1) of the 
Corporations Act for damage suffered by Chameleon as a result of Murchison’s 
contravention of section 79(c) of the Corporations Act.297 The damage suffered was 
deemed to include the profits made by Murchison and Grimaldi as a result of the 
contraventions.298 The orders made were constructed to preclude Chameleon from 
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double recovery in respect of the equitable remedies granted in relation to the breaches 
of fiduciary duty.299 
 
Winterfall was liable to account for the benefit received by its knowing receipt of the 
misapplied Chameleon cheque funds. 300 His Honour considered Winterfall’s benefit to 
be the same as that received by Murchison; that is, the benefit of the investment of the 
cheque funds as part of a pool of working capital.301 Accordingly, the account of profits 
was to be calculated on the same basis as for Murchison, but limited to the value of the 
cheques alone.302  
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The Full Court decision in Grimaldi was handed down on 21 February 2012. Their 
Honours Finn, Stone and Perram upheld much of Jacobson J’s first instance decision. 
The Full Court found that his Honour’s conclusions that Grimaldi was a de facto director 
of Chameleon and had owed and breached fiduciary duties to Chameleon in respect of 
the Cadetta transaction and Cheques transactions were unassailable.304 Likewise, their 
Honours confirmed the liability of Murchison as a knowing assistant and knowing 
recipient of the misapplied Chameleon cheque and Cadetta shares sale funds, and the 
liability of Winterfall as a knowing recipient of the misapplied cheque funds.  
 
Much of the appeal centred on the relief ordered by Jacobson J in respect of these 
conclusions. The Full Court confirmed that a constructive trust could not be imposed 
over Murchison’s interest in Winterfall on the basis of Jacobson J’s reasoning that the 
Murchison’s interest in Winterfall represented neither the profit nor the property 
obtained by Murchison as a result of Grimaldi and Barnes’ breaches of duty. In contrast, 
their Honours concluded that Jacobson J had erred in his characterisation of the benefit 
obtained by Winterfall, finding that the benefit obtained was in fact an interest in the 
Iron Jack tenements themselves. However, a constructive trust over a portion of 
Winterfall’s interest in the Iron Jack tenements in favour of Chameleon was refused on 
discretionary grounds. While confirming Murchison and Winterfall’s liability to account 
for profits received as a result of the misapplied Chameleon funds, their Honours 
overturned Jacobson J’s orders in relation to the accounts for reasons discussed further 
below, remitting the matter back to Jacobson J for further consideration.  
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In reaching their decision, their Honours discussed many principles relevant to the 
liability of third parties involved in breaches of fiduciary duty at length. The dicta and 
reasoning of their Honours provides valuable guidance as to the current state of 
Australian law in relation to third party liability.  
 
B Are the Two Limbs of Barnes v Addy Distinct? 
 
Their Honours in Grimaldi noted the existence of uncertainty in relation to a distinction 
between the two limbs of Barnes v Addy, but only considered the matter insofar as a 
distinction between the limbs gave rise to different levels of knowledge required for 
knowing receipt and knowing assistance.305 They considered that the conventional view 
in Commonwealth jurisdictions had been to treat the two limbs as distinct,306 and that 
this view had been exaggerated by the unjust enrichment and restitution arguments in 
relation to knowing receipt (that is, characterising knowing receipt liability as 
proprietary, versus personal, a position which was rejected in Australia in Farah).307 
Despite this, the courts had still been reluctant to accept strict liability for knowing 
receipt.308 Their Honours concluded that: 
 
[a]s with assistance liability, recipient liability should be seen as fault based and as making the 
same knowledge/notice demands as in assistance cases. We need not pursue this particular matter 
further because the weight of authority in this country appears now to draw no distinction 
between the two types of liability in this respect.309 
 
Importantly, their Honours in Grimaldi considered that Winterfall was liable as a 
knowing recipient despite no finding of dishonesty on the part of Zuks.310 In contrast, 
dishonesty on the part of the fiduciary is required to give rise to liability for knowing 
assistance.311 	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Lloyds Band Canada (1997) 152 DLR (4th) 411 (‘Citadel’); Royal Brunei [1995] 2 AC 378. 
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It appears that the present state of Australian law continues to draw a distinction 
between the two limbs of Barnes v Addy in relation to the relevance of the state of mind 
of the breaching fiduciary necessary to invoke the liability. However, as shall be evident 
from the further discussion below, once the liability is triggered by this dishonesty, there 
is no further meaningful distinction between the two limbs. 
 
C The Level of Knowledge Required for Knowing Receipt 
 
In Grimaldi, their Honours accepted that the liability of a third party for knowing receipt 
or knowing assistance is fault based, turning upon the knowledge that the third party had 
in relation to the breach of the fiduciary.312 Each liability was considered ‘to arise as a 
matter of conscience not of property’.313 As a result, the Full Court considered that the 
same level of knowledge or notice was required for knowing receipt as for knowing 
assistance.314 
 
While their Honours cautioned against the application of a classification system as a 
formulae for problem solving,315 they noted the High Court’s acceptance of the Baden 
categories in Farah and determined the knowledge requirement for knowing receipt in 
Grimaldi on the basis of the Baden classification system.316 Their Honours noted that, 
while Consul Development had been determined prior to Baden, it had been noted by 
judges in Australia since Baden that the views of Stephen J (with whom Barwick CJ 
agreed) and Gibbs J in Consul could be considered as accepting category (iv), but not 
category (v) constructive knowledge as sufficient to give rise to liability for knowing 
receipt.317 Their Honours agreed with this view.318 This line of authority was consistent 
also with the level of knowledge required for knowing assistance as determined in 	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316 See Grimaldi (2012) 287 ALR 22 at [259]-[270]. 
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Farah,319 and thus with the view of their Honours that the same knowledge or notice 
requirements should apply for both knowing receipt and knowing assistance.320  
 
Unless and until a different view is countenanced by the High Court, it now appears 
almost beyond doubt that the level of knowledge required to give rise to liability for 
knowing receipt is the same as that required for knowing assistance: levels (i)-(iv) but 
not level (v) of the Baden scale. 
 
D The Special Nature of Corporate Property 
 
1 Does Knowing Receipt Liability Extend to Breaches of Fiduciary Duty? 
 
Their Honours in Grimaldi considered the Belmont Finance position to be ‘well settled’; 
that is, that corporate property misapplied in breach of fiduciary duty is treated as ‘trust 
property’ for the purposes of Barnes v Addy.321 The Full Court in Grimaldi did not 
address the High Court’s caution on this point in Farah,322 instead endorsing Belmont 
Finance as authority for the principle that knowing recipient liability under Barnes v 
Addy extends to fiduciary relationships.323 While uncertainty will prevail in the absence 
of a definitive statement by the High Court, it is submitted that their Honours’ approach 
in Grimaldi was correct. 
 
It would indeed be an ‘odd result’324 if the first limb of Barnes v Addy was to be strictly 
applied to trust property only, in circumstances where the second limb is applied more 
broadly to include other fiduciary relationships. If, as Dietrich and Ridge contend,325 
knowing receipt and knowing assistance are both fault based and necessitate the same 
level of knowledge, it is difficult to justify the attribution of a higher level of 	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322 See Farah (2007) 287 ALR 22 at [161]-[163]. See earlier discussion above at page 13 in relation to the 
High Court’s caution in Farah. 
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wrongdoing to a person who knowingly receives property derived from a breach of trust, 
than to a person who knowingly receives property derived from a breach of fiduciary 
duty. In both instances, the deterrent function of Barnes v Addy liability serves to 
discourage a third party from exploiting the vulnerability of a beneficiary or principal 
that arises as a result of the trust or fiduciary relationship.326 The limitation of the first 
limb of Barnes v Addy to trust property in the strict sense would create an arbitrary 
distinction between knowing recipients of trust property and knowing recipients of 
corporate property that belies justification. 
 
2 Tracing Corporate Property 
 
The process of tracing allows a claimant to assert a claim to an asset held by the 
defendant on the basis that this asset sufficiently represents an asset that formerly 
belonged to the claimant.327 The claimant may trace on the ground that he or she retains 
a beneficial interest in property handled or received by the defendant (for example, 
where true trust property is transferred in breach of trust to a third party with knowledge 
of the breach).328 It is therefore necessary to identify the original property belonging to 
the claimant and the nature of the claimant’s interest in that property, before considering 
whether the property currently held by the defendant sufficiently represents that property 
and the related interest of the claimant.329 Tracing is a process, rather than a remedy; 
once tracing is successfully completed, a separate inquiry arises as to what, if any rights 
the claimant holds in relation to the traced asset.330  
 
The Full Court in Grimaldi considered that little difficulty arises when following true 
trust property into the hands of another, due to the ‘antecedent entitlement’ to the trust 
property held by the trust beneficiaries as a result of their beneficial ownership of the 
property.331 Their Honours considered that the special nature of corporate property, 	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however, gives rise to a ‘real difficulty’ in relation to the tracing process.332 As a 
company is the sole legal and beneficial owner of its property, where the property is 
transferred to a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, both the legal and 
beneficial ownership in the property transfers with the property.333 However, where the 
property is transferred in breach of fiduciary duty to a third party with knowledge of that 
breach, the third party becomes a ‘constructive trustee’ of the misapplied funds.334 It is 
the knowledge of the third party of the breach of fiduciary duty that can turn it into a 
constructive trustee.335 
 
According to the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Evans v European Bank Ltd,336 it 
is this constructive trusteeship that provides the company with the proprietary base 
necessary to follow its property into the hands of the third party and trace into its 
substitutes.337 The constructive trusteeship here is a personal liability, consistent with the 
use of the term by Lord Selborne in Barnes v Addy.338  
 
The Full Court in Grimaldi accepted Evans as authority for the principle that the 
company lacks a proprietary interest in their misapplied property until the court deems 
the recipient of the property a constructive trustee.339 Chin finds this need to impose a 
constructive trust for the purposes of tracing ‘baffling’.340 If the company is the 
beneficial owner of its funds then it retains antecedent property rights in relation to its 
misapplied funds received by a fiduciary or third party with knowledge, regardless of the 
imposition or otherwise of the court of a constructive trust over the funds.341 As a result, 
Chin considers that the proprietary base needed for tracing exists from the point of the 
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misapplication of the funds and recovery in property does not depend on the third party 
recipient being deemed a constructive trustee.342 
 
Their Honours in Grimaldi did not question the accuracy of Evans, instead turning to the 
question of whether: 
 
If… a proprietary base sufficient to justify following and tracing corporate property turns 
critically on the court imposing a constructive trust on the property received (the company having 
no antecedent interest in it in the recipient’s hands), the fundamental question becomes whether 
the court has any discretion not to do so.343 
 
Their Honours considered that it did not appear to accord with the accepted principles of 
appropriate remedy and practical justice (discussed further below) for the court to be 
required to impose a constructive trusteeship on a third party recipient in all 
circumstances.344 As a matter of both proper principle and binding authority, the court is 
not obliged to impose a constructive trust in circumstances where it is appropriate to 
leave the company to the personal remedies of an account of profits or equitable 
compensation.345  
 
E The Elusive Proprietary Remedy 
 
1 Principles Governing the Imposition of a Constructive Trust 
 
The Full Court in Grimaldi undertook a substantial analysis of the principles governing 
the grant of a constructive trust in relation to third party involvement in breaches of 
fiduciary duty.346 Their Honours emphasised the discretionary nature of the constructive 
trust, noting a ‘contemporary convergence’ in constructive trust claims between the 
‘principle of appropriateness’ (an equitable remedy must be fashioned to fit the nature of 	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the case and particular facts)347 and the requirement to do ‘practical justice’ (avoiding 
transforming the liability of the fiduciary into a vehicle for the unjust enrichment of the 
plaintiff).348 They considered that: 
 
in many cases and for many types of equitable wrong, the remedy that is most appropriate will 
self select absent unusual circumstances.349 
 
Their Honours emphasised that this conclusion was not reflective of a lack of discretion 
on the part of the court, but was instead based on a ‘mixture of learning, intuition and 
experience’ and the type of remedy that may predictably arise from the application of a 
particular doctrine.350 Likewise, their Honours considered that the purpose served by a 
particular doctrine that gives rise to a constructive trust claim may have a large bearing 
on the question of what is appropriate in the circumstances of a given case.351  
 
Their Honours outlined various considerations of ‘principle and pragmatism’ that bear 
upon the award or refusal of a constructive trust.352 They noted what they referred to as 
the ‘presumptive rule’ in Hospital Products:353 that a fiduciary that has accrued a benefit 
by breach of duty or misuse of position is liable to account for it, and the appropriate 
remedy in these circumstances is a constructive trust.354  Their Honours compared the 
situation of a third party involved in a breach of fiduciary duty, noting that a like rule in 
relation to the grant of a proprietary remedy has not been enunciated in relation to the 
benefits derived by those third parties who participate in breaches of fiduciary duty.355 
Their Honours considered that the reluctance of the courts to impose a constructive trust 
in relation to third parties may be explained by reference to the obligation that the 
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fiduciary assumes to prefer the interests of the principal over his or her own interest and 
the fact that a like obligation is not assumed by the third party.356  
 
Their Honours did not consider this lack of undertaking on the part of the third party to 
pose a bar to the imposition of a constructive trust in relation to knowing recipients of 
trust property in the strict sense, whom they considered will ordinarily be liable to hold 
the trust property or its traceable proceeds, plus any attributable profits, on trust for the 
beneficiary.357 The Full Court accepted the conclusion in Zhu v Treasurer of New South 
Wales358 as to the bases for this distinction: 
 
Intervention against a third party who obtains trust property from a trustee in breach of trust is 
based on the need to protect the proprietary interests of the beneficiaries. Intervention against a 
third party who obtains some other advantage as a result of the trustee’s breach of trust is based 
on the need to ensure that the trust receives property which, if it were to be acquired at all, should 
have been acquired for the trust.359 
 
However, their Honours considered that the situation is more complicated where the 
trust property is not trust property in the strict sense, but instead corporate property 
misapplied in breach of fiduciary duty.360 As discussed above,361 this appears to be 
because their Honours considered that, unlike trust property, where the wronged 
beneficiary retains beneficial ownership of trust property transferred in breach of trust, 
and therefore holds a proprietary interest in the misapplied property sufficient to follow 
it into the hands of others, a wronged corporate principal lacks the necessary proprietary 
interest over corporate property transferred in breach of fiduciary duty unless and until 
the court deems the recipient of the property a constructive trustee. This suggests that the 
special nature of corporate property may pose a further bar to the appropriateness of the 
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constructive trust as a remedy in relation to corporate property received as a result of a 
breach of fiduciary duty. 
  
Their Honours noted the need to avoid thrusting parties into a continuing business 
relationship by imposing a constructive trust where it is clear that there is no confidence 
or comity between the parties.362 Similarly, they considered that an account of profits 
may be preferable where an innocent third party may be forced into an unwanted 
relationship with the claimant should a constructive trust be imposed.363 Also of 
importance is the impact of the imposition of a constructive trust to the interests of 
innocent third parties, even in circumstances where the plaintiff has no other useful 
remedy against the defendant.364 Innocent third parties to be considered include not only 
unsecured creditors,365 but also those affected because of their legitimate rights, interests 
or expectations in relation to the property in question,366 and others generally.367  
 
Their Honours considered that the award of a constructive trust must be a proportionate 
response having regard to the degree of wrongdoing of the defendant and the extent to 
which the benefit derived was attributable to this wrongdoing.368 It must not go ‘beyond 
the necessities of the case’.369 Ultimately, their Honours considered that proprietary 
relief must never be mandatory and the court must retain a discretion allowing them to 
refuse the imposition of a constructive trust in circumstances where a proprietary 
remedy is inappropriate.370  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
362 Grimaldi (2012) 287 ALR 22 at [510]; Warman (1995) 182 CLR 544 at 544, 564. 
363 Grimaldi (2012) 287 ALR 22 at [510]. 
364 Grimaldi (2012) 287 ALR 22 at [508], [510]; John Alexander's Clubs Pty Ltd v White City Tennis Club 
Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 1 (‘John Alexander’s Clubs’) at [128]-[129]. 
365 Grimaldi (2012) 287 ALR 22 at [510]; Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 CLR 583 at 523. 
366 Grimaldi (2012) 287 ALR 22 at [510]; Giumelli v Giumelli (1999) 196 CLR 101 at [49]-[50]. 
367 Grimaldi (2012) 287 ALR 22 at [510]; John Alexander’s Clubs (2010) 241 CLR 1 at [129]. 
368 Grimaldi (2012) 287 ALR 22 at [510]. 
369 Grimaldi (2012) 287 ALR 22 at [510]; John Alexander’s Clubs (2010) 241 CLR 1 at [129]. 
370 Grimaldi (2012) 287 ALR 22 at [511]. 
 55	  
2 Was Winterfall Liable as a Constructive Trustee? 
 
The Full Court disagreed with Jacobson J’s characterisation of the benefit received by 
Winterfall as a result of its knowing receipt of the Chameleon cheque funds. Jacobson J 
had considered that Winterfall had received the same benefit as Murchison, that being 
‘the benefit of the investment of the funds as part of a pool of working capital, 
comprising debt and equity’.371 The Full Court instead found that the benefit obtained by 
Winterfall through the misapplied funds was in fact an interest in the Iron Jacks 
tenements themselves.372  
 
In accordance with their Honours’ conclusion that the grant of a proprietary remedy 
must remain discretionary, the Full Court rejected Chameleon’s claim that it was entitled 
as of right to the imposition of a constructive trust on the cheques received by 
Winterfall, which could then be traced into the Iron Jack tenements.373 Their Honours 
considered that, as the cheque funds were corporate property, rather than true trust 
property, it was necessary for the court to impose a constructive trust over the funds 
before they could be traced into the Iron Jack tenements.374 Before the court could 
impose the necessary constructive trust, it was required to be satisfied that proprietary 
relief must be the appropriate form of relief in the circumstances.375 While noting that 
proprietary relief may well be expected to be the appropriate relief in a knowing receipt 
case, such as this one, where the property received or its traceable proceeds remained 
wholly or partly extant, their Honours declared this to be an ‘exceptional case’, largely 
as a result of the events transpiring after Winterfall’s receipt of the cheque money.376 
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Their Honours identified a number of factors that together formed the basis for their 
conclusion that proprietary relief was inappropriate in the circumstances and would go 
well beyond the necessities of the case.377  
 
Firstly, they considered that the instalment payment made with the cheque funds had to 
be considered in the context in which it was made; its proper complexion in this context 
was that it was part of the outlays made and activities engaged in or foreshadowed in 
anticipation of the Iron Jack mining operation (the ‘Project’), rather than simply a 
purchase of the Iron Jack asset.378 This suggests that the characterisation of the 
transaction in which misapplied corporate funds are used by the knowing recipient is 
relevant to the consideration of whether a grant of proprietary relief may be appropriate 
in the circumstances.  
 
Their Honours also considered that it was not appropriate to disregard or give 
diminished significance to other matters (such as Winterfall’s financial need that drove it 
to accept money in circumstances where it shouldn’t have) where the reason for 
awarding proprietary relief was not to discipline a misbehaving fiduciary.379 In this 
sense, while the liability of a fiduciary to account for benefits obtained in breach of trust 
is strict, and the ‘presumptive’ rule is that the appropriate remedy is by way of 
constructive trust,380 it appears that the remoteness of the third party may allow for 
greater consideration of mitigating circumstances in relation to the appropriateness or 
otherwise of imposing a constructive trust.381 
 
While their Honours noted that the ‘capital base’ of Winterfall had been corrupted by the 
receipt of the Chameleon funds, this base had grown enormously as a result of 
subsequent additions of debt and equity finance contributed in good faith and by 
reinvested profits; Winterfall had evolved substantially since the receipt of the 
Chameleon funds, and Grimaldi was not simply a ‘case of wrongdoers continuing 	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knowingly to perpetuate their own wrongs to their own advantage behind a corporate 
form’.382 Chin notes the emphasis that their Honours placed in Grimaldi on changes in 
the governance and capital base of both Winterfall and Murchison following the 
wrongdoing of the parties.383 Considerations such as the removal of Grimaldi from 
Murchison’s board of directors following the reverse takeover of Winterfall, the 
different, ‘less damning’ state of mind of the new directors, and changes in the capital 
base of the parties were relevant to the question of appropriate relief and appeared to 
have a mitigating influence on the choice between proprietary and personal relief.384 
 
Also relevant was the consideration that the wrongdoing in Grimaldi did not involve the 
diversion of a corporate opportunity from Chameleon at its expense. Likewise, 
Winterfall did not act over time to Chameleon’s detriment.385 Chameleon’s interests 
were directed primarily to gold, not the iron ore to which the Iron Jack tenements 
related.386  
 
Their Honours noted that, following the misapplication of Chameleon’s funds, the value 
of the Project had been significantly enhanced by investors, who should be properly 
considered innocent third parties. Expenditure to develop the Project and related capital 
raising since the misapplication of Chameleon’s funds dwarfed the involuntary 
contribution of Chameleon by millions of dollars.387 It was also relevant that Chameleon 
had not assumed any of the risk related to the Project, nor contributed to the enterprise or 
expertise required for the Project, including exploration and analysis costs, expenditure 
on infrastructure, solving of infrastructure problems, and the Project itself (which was 
undertaken in a climate of market volatility), all of which helped give value to the 
tenement rights acquired by Winterfall.388  
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Given that the increase in value of the Iron Jack tenements had resulted primarily from 
the contributions, industry and risk-taking of Murchison, Winterfall and investors, their 
Honours considered that the award of a constructive trust in the circumstances would be 
a punitive measure against Winterfall and would transform Winterfall’s recipient 
liability into a vehicle for the unjust enrichment of Chameleon.389 To give Chameleon a 
proportionate interest in the Iron Jack tenements would also thrust the parties into a 
business relationship where there was unlikely to be comity or confidence between 
them.390 The prospect of dispute, disruption and destabilisation of an established mining 
operation and associated infrastructure development in the circumstances was 
considered self-evident.391 
 
Their Honours’ conclusions highlight the difficulty that a claimant faces in establishing 
circumstances appropriate to the award of a proprietary remedy in relation to the benefits 
derived by knowing recipients and knowing assistants. As Chin notes, a right is only as 
valuable as the remedies.392 Of no small interest in Grimaldi is the commercial impetus 
of Chameleon’s claim. Chameleon, a small, start-up mining company, had funds of 
some $277,840 misappropriated in breaches of fiduciary duty by Barnes and Grimaldi 
with no further losses by way of a diversion of corporate opportunity or otherwise.393 
Yet, as Jacobson J noted in his first instance decision, Chameleon’s claim to a 
constructive trust was ‘a very large one’.394 As the $660 million value of Murchison at 
the time of trial was considered to be almost solely attributable to Murchison’s interest 
in the Iron Jack Project, Chameleon’s claim for a constructive trust over the entirety of 
Murchison’s shareholding in Winterfall amounted to many hundreds of millions of 
dollars.395 Jacobson J noted that even a claim by Chameleon for a proportionate interest 
in the tenements (on the basis of the proportion that the misapplied Chameleon funds 
bore to the total consideration paid for the tenements by Winterfall) would amount to 
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about $160 million.396 Murchison characterised Chameleon’s claim as ‘an egregious 
attempt at gold digging’.397  
 
Their Honours in Grimaldi emphasised that the liability of the fiduciary or third party 
participant to account for benefits obtained from the relevant breach of duty must be 
appropriate to the circumstances of the case, and must not be ‘transformed into a vehicle 
for the unjust enrichment of the plaintiff’.398 As such, Grimaldi provides support for the 
proposition that so-called ‘opportunistic’ claims over a commercially valuable asset that 
can be linked to a breach of fiduciary duty will have limited prospects of providing a 
financial windfall to the claimant. 
 
F Is Third Party Liability Joint and Several? 
 
The Full Court noted that there are subsisting uncertainties as to whether and/or when 
the liabilities of knowing assistants and knowing recipients are joint and several with 
those of the breaching fiduciary.399 Their Honours were not required to consider the 
question of whether third party liability in relation to the losses of the principal was joint 
and several, or several only.400 However, they expressed the view that such liability 
remained several only401 without further elaboration as to the reasons for their 
conclusion.  
 
Their Honours supported Ridge’s view of the general inappropriateness of joint and 
several liability of the third party for the gains of the breaching fiduciary,402 noting that 
the liability of third parties for profits or gains arising from a breach of fiduciary duty is 
ordinarily several only.403 The Full Court considered criticism of Canadian authority 
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supporting joint and several liability in ordinary cases to be justified on the basis that 
such liability could be considered penal.404  
 
However, the Full Court noted two extraordinary cases in which joint and several 
liability may be imposed. The first is where the third party is the alter ego or ‘nominee’ 
of the fiduciary; in such circumstances, it is settled that the third party will be jointly and 
severally liable for any gains of the fiduciary.405 The second case is less certain, and 
occurs where the fiduciary and third party act in concert to misappropriate trust property 
or breach fiduciary duty to secure a mutual benefit.406 Neither line of extraordinary cases 
applied to the actions of Murchison or Winterfall in Grimaldi; both companies were held 
severally liable only for the profits derived from their involvement in Barnes and 
Grimaldi’s breaches of fiduciary duty.407 
 
G The Rescission Requirement 
 
In Grimaldi, Murchison and Chameleon agreed that, if in fact the cheque payments by 
Chameleon to Murchison constituted a loan on the running loan account between 
Chameleon and Murchison, the rescission requirement mandated that Chameleon could 
not assert equitable title to the cheque funds or to the assets into which they could be 
traced, or seek relief against third parties by way of tracing, unless and until Chameleon 
avoided the loan by seeking an order for rescission.408 While the Full Court upheld 
Jacobson J’s finding that the misapplied Chameleon cheque funds were not loans,409 
they noted the ‘curious consequence’ of the rescission requirement.410 
 
The curiosity appears to arise from the fact that, while the mere form of a transaction 
such as a loan or purchase cannot ‘stay the hand of equity’ for the purposes of recipient 	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liability under Barnes v Addy,411 a constructive trust cannot simply be imposed over the 
funds acquired by a third party who knowingly receives the fund through a contract of 
loan or purchase entered into in breach of fiduciary duty.412 While the contract must be 
rescinded before proprietary relief may be granted, there is no rescission requirement 
where a personal remedy such as an account of profits is sought.413  
 
The Full Court noted that the ‘understanding of the use of the constructive trust as a 
remedy… has evolved in recent times’,414 and considered that this may well lead to a 
review of the rescission requirement in relation to third party knowing receipt.415 In 
reference to the evolved understanding of the constructive trust as a remedy, their 
Honours cited Bathurst City Council v PWC Properties Pty Ltd,416 where the High Court 
stated that:  
 
before the court imposes a constructive trust as a remedy, it should first decide whether, having 
regard to the issues in the litigation, there are other means available to quell the controversy. An 
equitable remedy which falls short of the imposition of a trust may assist in avoiding a result 
whereby the plaintiff gains a beneficial proprietary interest which gives an unfair priority over 
other equally deserving creditors of the defendant.417 
 
In situations where a wronged principal effectively avoids a transaction on the basis that 
it was effected in breach of fiduciary duty, the third party recipient is considered to hold 
the property on constructive trust for the principal. This generates a proprietary interest 
in favour of the principal, which may be unfair to innocent third parties, including 
perhaps innocent creditors of the third party in circumstances where the third party 
becomes insolvent.  
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Importantly, their Honours noted that, regardless of any prior title that a person may be 
able to assert over property following rescission, the key question remains whether a 
constructive trust is the appropriate remedy in the circumstances.418 Implicit in their 
Honours’ reasoning is that the constructive trust that arises following the effective 
rescission of the contract should not arise as a matter of right, but should instead be 
considered discretionary. This is consistent with the approach of their Honours to the 
question of whether the court retains a discretion to impose a constructive trust over 
corporate property misapplied in breaches of fiduciary duty if such a trust is necessary to 
provide a proprietary base to the company for the purposes of following and tracing the 
property. As noted above, in those circumstances their Honours concluded that, both as a 
matter of principle and authority, the imposition of the constructive trust is 
discretionary.419 
 
Their Honours’ view is also consistent with that of Gibbs CJ in Daly. As noted above, 
the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia in Hancock considered it to be 
clear from the reasoning of Gibbs CJ that a constructive trust is not automatically 
imposed upon money lent in circumstances that give rise to a breach of fiduciary duty 
following the rescission of the contract of loan.420 While a constructive trust may be 
awarded as a discretionary remedy, such a remedy will not be granted where it is beyond 
what is necessary to do equity in the circumstances.421 
 
Despite their apparent concerns that the operation of the rescission requirement may 
provide an unfair priority to the claimant, hence going beyond what is necessary to do 
equity, their Honours in Grimaldi endorsed the rescission requirement as it currently 
stands as a matter of comity with the views of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in 
Robins and the Full Court of the Western Australian Supreme Court in Hancock.422  
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H Assessing the Profit in a Mining Venture 
 
The Full Court in Grimaldi overturned Jacobson J’s orders in relation to Murchison and 
Winterfall’s liability to account for profits derived from their use of Chameleon’s 
funds.423 In the case of Winterfall, their Honours considered that Jacobson J had erred in 
his assessment of the benefit derived from the use of Chameleon’s funds.424 In the case 
of Murchison, their Honours considered that Jacobson J had wrongly declined to include 
a consideration of expected future profits in his orders,425 and questions remained as to 
whether Murchison should be awarded a just allowance in relation to the profits 
earned.426 The Full Court declined to provide substituted orders on the basis that the 
parties be afforded a chance to make further submissions as to the appropriate orders, 
and instead remitted the matter back to the trial judge for reconsideration.427  
 
Their Honours comments provide a significant amount of guidance as to how profits in a 
mining venture may best be assessed. The fundamental principle in any account of 
profits is that the account must be confined to profits actually made, so as not to result in 
the unjust enrichment of the claimant.428 In Grimaldi, their Honours considered that 
Chameleon’s money had been used to establish a mining business,429 bringing Grimaldi 
within the ambit of the Docker v Somes430 line of cases.  
 
Docker v Somes was concerned with the recovery of trust money improperly introduced 
into a trade or business.431 It established the principle that, in such cases, the 
beneficiaries were entitled to insist upon a share of the profits made from the business, 
rather than interest only on the amount of trust money employed in the business.432 In 
circumstances where the entirety of the business was attributable to the trust funds, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
423 Grimaldi (2012) 287 ALR 22 at [744]. 
424 Grimaldi (2012) 287 ALR 22 at [740]. 
425 Grimaldi (2012) 287 ALR 22 at [738]. 
426 Grimaldi (2012) 287 ALR 22 at [738], [730]-[732]. 
427 Grimaldi (2012) 287 ALR 22 at [743]-[744]. 
428 Dart Industries Inc v Décor Corporation Pty Ltd (1993) 179 CLR 101 at 114-115; Dal Pont and 
Chalmers, above n 327, [34.125]. 
429 Grimaldi (2012) 287 ALR 22 at [519]. 
430 (1834) 2 My & K 655; 39 ER 1095. 
431 Grimaldi (2012) 287 ALR 22 at [519]. 
432 Grimaldi (2012) 287 ALR 22 at [520]. 
 64	  
beneficiary was entitled to the entirety of the profits.433 Where the profit derived from 
the business was attributable in part to the skill and labour of the trustee in the 
development of the business, apportionment was authorised.434 However, in cases where 
serious difficulty was encountered in tracing and apportioning the profits of the business, 
a fixed rate of interest was considered perhaps the more appropriate remedy.435 
 
As an alternative to apportioning the profits of a business, the court may award a just 
allowance to the fiduciary.436 When utilising this method, the court will ordinarily 
deduct an amount representing the contribution, skill and industry of the fiduciary in 
making the profits from the total amount of profits made, before dividing the profits 
between the fiduciary and beneficiary in proportion to the percentage that the trust 
money represented to the total capital invested.437  
 
The Full Court in Grimaldi noted that modern Australian authority follows the Docker v 
Somes line of cases.438 As stated by the High Court in Warman,439 it would be 
inequitable to order a breaching fiduciary to account for the entirety of the profits where 
a portion of the profits is attributable to the fiduciary’s skill, efforts, property and 
resources.440 The onus of establishing the inequity lies with the fiduciary.441 
 
While their Honours found the Docker v Somes line of cases instructive, they 
emphasised the relevance of the distinctive character of mining businesses in 
determining the profit received as a result of a breach of fiduciary duty or trust involving 
a mining business.442 Mining businesses are inherently risky and involve time, care, 
attention, skill, expenditure and the investment of risk capital to develop.443 The nature 	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of the mining business has a direct bearing on the attribution of profits to capital 
investment, expertise, exertion and the assumption of risk incurred in generating 
profits.444 
 
In particular, their Honours noted the US case of Primeau v Granfield.445 This case 
involved the wrongful use of money held on trust for Primeau in the development of the 
trustee’s own gold mine. The trust money was later returned and a claim made by 
Primeau for an account of the benefit received by the trustee as a result of his breach of 
trust. Learned Hand LJ determined that Primeau’s money had been used to acquire 
rights to explore for, extract, transport and sell gold.446 His Lordship refused the remedy 
of a constructive trust, instead awarding an account of profits in Primeau’s favour. The 
benefit derived from the use of the trust money, for which the trustee was accountable to 
Primeau, was the profits of the business proportionate to the amount that Primeau’s 
money represented to the total consideration paid for the mining rights, after taking into 
account the expenditure by the trustee that ‘gave those rights their value’.447 His 
Lordship determined that Primeau was entitled to: 
 
that proportion of the value of the ore in situ, as is represented by his contribution to the total 
expenses of working, plus the total rentals or royalties paid the lessor.448 
 
Primeau was also entitled to interest on these sums, calculated from the date that his 
trust money was received by the trustee.449 The accounting liability was a continuing 
one, not limited to the date of judgment.450 No part of the profits made by the trustee was 
attributable to sources other than capital.451 In other words, no allowance had been made 
in favour of the trustee for their skill and labour in working the gold mine.452 	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Their Honours applied Primeau v Granfield when assessing the personal remedy to 
which they considered Chameleon was entitled as a result of Winterfall’s use of 
Chameleon’s funds in the acquisition of the Iron Jacks tenements.453 However, their 
Honours entertained the possibility that a just allowance for the skill, risk-taking and 
exertion of Winterfall in developing the mining business may be appropriate.454 They 
considered that Chameleon was entitled to relief from Winterfall by way of a 
proportionate share in the net profits from ore found, extracted, transported and 
marketed and sold which had been, or would be, extracted over the life of the Iron Jack 
Project, less the costs of finding, etc that ore and, arguably, less any such allowance as 
Winterfall may be allowed for its skill, risk-taking and exertion in finding, etc, the 
ore.455 Their Honours suggested that this benefit may best be reflected in a royalty-like 
payment on the ore extracted.456  
 
Their Honours also considered Murchison was required to account for profits derived 
from the Iron Jack Project over the life of the project, and not limited to the date of 
judgment.457 Their Honours noted that Murchison’s benefits appeared to flow from its 
ownership of Winterfall.458 However, despite the subsidiary and parent relationship of 
Winterfall and Murchison following the reverse takeover, the liability of each party to 
account was several, with each only required to account for the benefit actually received 
by them as a result of the Chameleon funds misused by them, and not for any benefit 
derived by the other.459 Likewise, any allowances to be granted in relation to either 
account of profits were limited to the skill (etc) of the party to whom the account 
related.460  
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One final point requires consideration in relation to the assessment of profits derived 
from a mining venture.  The total consideration paid by Winterfall for the Iron Jack 
tenements included a royalty payment to the vendors of 80 cents per tonne of ore.461 
Jacobson J considered that the royalty payment was irrelevant in calculating the 
proportion that Chameleon’s misapplied funds represented to the total consideration paid 
for the Iron Jack tenements.462 Although not in issue on appeal, their Honours noted in 
obiter that the royalty payment was in fact relevant to this consideration.463 Given the 
prevalence of royalty-type arrangements in mining ventures, this point is an important 
one to bear in mind when attempting to apportion profits derived from a mining 
business.  
 
I Cumulative Equitable and Statutory Remedies Against Third Parties 
 
Section 1317H of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the ‘Corporations Act’) provides 
that a court may order a person to compensate a company where the person has 
contravened a civil penalty provision of the Corporations Act in relation to the company 
and the company has suffered damage as a result.464 ‘Damage’ may include profits made 
by any person resulting from the contravention.465 Section 185 of the Act provides that 
sections 180-184 of the Act (the statutory directors’ duties provisions) operate in 
addition to, and not in derogation of, any general law relating to the duty or liability of a 
person because of their office or employment in relation to a corporation.466 
 
As a result of the operation of section 185, where a director or officer’s breach of 
fiduciary duty also results in a contravention of a civil penalty provision of the 
Corporations Act, it is open to a corporation to claim both an equitable remedy (such as 
an account of profits) and statutory compensation (potentially including profits) in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
461 Grimaldi (2012) 287 ALR 22 at [735]. 
462 Grimaldi (2012) 287 ALR 22 at [735]. 
463 Grimaldi (2012) 287 ALR 22 at [735]. 
464 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 1317H. 
465 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 1317H(2). The Full Court in Grimaldi determined that the court is 
merely empowered, rather than obliged, to include damages in an assessment of compensation: Grimaldi 
(2012) 287 ALR 22 at [631]. 
466 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 185. 
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relation to the breaches.467 In many cases, the profits claimed in relation to an account of 
profits and statutory compensation will be the same.468 While the corporation is not 
required to elect between statutory and equitable remedies, it is prevented from double 
recovery in respect of the same profits.469 Accordingly, section 185 is held to permit 
cumulative remedies.470 
 
In Grimaldi, the position was less clear in relation to third parties involved in breaches 
of duty. Under section 79 of the Act, a third party who aids, abets, counsels, procures, 
induces, is knowingly concerned in, or has conspired with others to effect a 
contravention of the Corporations Act may be liable for involvement in another’s 
contravention of the Act.471 Section 83 of the Act imputes liability for contraventions of 
the Act to those deemed to be involved in the contravention under section 79.472  
 
In his first instance decision, Jacobson J deemed Murchison to be involved in Barnes 
and Grimaldi’s contraventions of the Corporations Act by virtue of sections 79(a) and 
(c) of the Act.473 The Full Court upheld this finding on appeal.474 As a result of his 
finding, Jacobson J considered that Barnes and Grimaldi’s breaches of sections 181 and 
182 of the Corporations Act were imputed to Murchison and a compensation order, 
including profits, was made against Murchison under section 1317H.475 His Honour 
framed the orders so that the statutory compensation order operated cumulatively with 
the orders requiring Murchison to account for profits acquired through its participation 
in Barnes and Grimaldi’s breaches of fiduciary duty.  
 
Murchison challenged these orders on appeal on the basis of the formulation of section 
185 of the Act. Murchison argued that, because section 185 did not explicitly deal with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
467 Grimaldi (2012) 287 ALR 22 at [640]. 
468 Grimaldi (2012) 287 ALR 22 at [641]. 
469 Grimaldi (2012) 287 ALR 22 at [641]; Re HIH Insurance; ASIC v Adler (2002) 168 FLR 253 at [116]-
[118]. 
470 Grimaldi (2012) 287 ALR 22 at [641]. 
471 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 79. 
472 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 83. 
473 Chameleon [2010] FCA 1129 at [707]. 
474 Grimaldi (2012) 287 ALR 22 at [345]. 
475 Chameleon [2010] FCA 1129 at [1105]. 
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third parties, and no alternative provision in the Act sanctioned cumulative equitable and 
statutory remedies in relation to third parties, Chameleon should be required to elect 
between statutory compensation and an account of profits, and should not be allowed a 
cumulative remedy.476 
 
The Full Court considered that the lack of explicit authorisation in the Corporations Act 
for cumulative statutory and general law remedies against involved third parties did not 
prevent such orders from being given,477 and rejected Murchison’s contention that, 
absent an express statutory provision recognising the co-existence of other remedies, the 
statutory and equitable liabilities were alternatives.478 Their Honours noted that, while 
the statutory and equitable remedies may produce similar or overlapping results in given 
cases, it had not been suggested that they would provide identical relief in all 
circumstances.479 Likewise, their Honours could see no reason why the policy objectives 
of section 185 should not apply equally to both an involved third party and breaching 
fiduciary.480 Their Honours concluded that the statutory and equitable remedies could 
operate cumulatively in relation to involved third parties, subject to the preclusion of 
double recovery.481 
 
It is submitted that their Honours’ conclusion is correct. As their Honours noted, 
Murchison was liable on two distinct bases,482 each of which provides its own remedy 
system.483 No provision of the Corporations Act precludes the award of a general law 
remedy where a statutory remedy has been granted in these circumstances, or vice versa. 
While the remedies may relate to similar, if not the same, profits in many situations, 
there is no reason why a cumulative remedy may not be granted where there are 
differences between the profits in question, provided that no double recovery of profits 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
476 Grimaldi (2012) 287 ALR 22 at [645]. 
477 Grimaldi (2012) 287 ALR 22 at [647]. 
478 Grimaldi (2012) 287 ALR 22 at [649]. 
479 Grimaldi (2012) 287 ALR 22 at [685]. 
480 Grimaldi (2012) 287 ALR 22 at [649]. 
481 Grimaldi (2012) 287 ALR 22 at [648]. 
482 That is, knowing receipt and knowing assistance in equity, and as a person involved in a contravention 
of the Corporations Act under statute. 
483 Grimaldi (2012) 287 ALR 22 at [648]. 
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occurs. To put a wronged principal to election between general law and statutory 
remedies in such circumstances may require the principal to forfeit its claim to a portion 
of the profit derived from the breach of duty, effectively resulting in the retention of a 
benefit obtained by the third party in circumstances where they have acted wrongfully 





The decision in Grimaldi provides further force to the argument that third party liability 
is a fault based, primary liability driven by equity’s concern with the third party’s own 
wrongdoing. While there remains a distinction between the two limbs of Barnes v Addy 
in the sense that dishonesty is required on the part of the fiduciary to trigger liability for 
knowing assistance, but not for knowing receipt, there is no further distinction in relation 
to the level of knowledge required of the third party or the remedies that may be 
awarded against the third party. For now, the English position of Royal Brunei has been 
rejected in Australia and third party liability is clearly based on what the third party 
knew, or had reason to know, of the breach of duty or the dishonest and fraudulent 
design of the fiduciary. 
 
While we await confirmation from the High Court that the first limb of Barnes v Addy 
extends beyond breaches of trust to include other breaches of fiduciary duty, it otherwise 
appears all but resolved that the Belmont Finance characterisation of corporate property 
in relation to Barnes v Addy liability has been adopted in Australia. Unresolved 
questions remain, however, in relation to the special nature of corporate property in this 
regard, including whether the court is required to impose a constructive trust over 
corporate property misapplied in breach of fiduciary duty before a company will hold a 
sufficient proprietary interest to trace the property; and whether the rescission 
requirement in its current formulation should be retained in relation to third party 
involvement in breaches of fiduciary duty.  
 
Perhaps most significantly, the decision in Grimaldi illustrates the difficulty that a 
company may face in obtaining a proprietary remedy in relation to company property 
misapplied in breach of fiduciary duty, or property derived by a third party in their own 
right as a result of their participation in a breach of fiduciary duty. Proprietary remedies 
in relation to third parties are clearly discretionary, and should not be awarded where a 
lesser remedy will be sufficient to do equity. The remoteness of the third party to the 
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principal (as compared to the close relationship between the principal and fiduciary) 
appears to have a significant bearing on the appropriateness or otherwise of awarding a 
proprietary remedy, as does the impact of a proprietary remedy upon innocent third 
parties.  
 
The characterisation of the benefit flowing to the third party as a result of the breach of 
fiduciary duty is also significant. Where corporate property is misappropriated and used 
in the development of a business, the nature of the business may be relevant to both the 
appropriateness of a proprietary remedy, and consideration of the profits obtained as a 
result of the breach, including whether allowances should be made to a third party for 
skill, labour and risk-taking in relation to the generation of profits. 
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VII EPILOGUE: THE SPECIAL LEAVE APPLICATION 
 
On 17 August 2012, special leave was denied by the High Court in relation to 
Grimaldi’s bid to appeal the findings made against him to the High Court.484 Grimaldi’s 
special leave application was made and denied solely on the basis of questions 
concerning when someone may be found to be a de facto director of a corporation under 
the Corporations Act and was not relevant to questions of liability in relation to third 
parties.  
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